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Abstract
We consider a Shannon cipher system for memoryless sources, in which distortion is allowed at the legitimate
decoder. The source is compressed using a rate distortion code secured by a shared key, which satisfies a constraint
on the compression rate, as well as a constraint on the exponential rate of the excess-distortion probability at
the legitimate decoder. Secrecy is measured by the exponential rate of the exiguous-distortion probability at the
eavesdropper, rather than by the traditional measure of equivocation. We define the perfect secrecy exponent as the
maximal exiguous-distortion exponent achievable when the key rate is unlimited. Under limited key rate, we prove
that the maximal achievable exiguous-distortion exponent is equal to the minimum between the average key rate
and the perfect secrecy exponent, for a fairly general class of variable key rate codes.
Index Terms
Information-theoretic secrecy, Shannon cipher system, secret key, cryptography, lossy compression, rate-distortion
theory, error exponent, large-deviations, covering lemmas.
I. INTRODUCTION
In his seminal paper [1], Shannon has introduced a mathematical framework for secret communication. The
cipher system is considered perfectly secure if the cryptogram and the message are statistically independent, and
so, an eavesdropper does not gain any information when he observes the cryptogram. To achieve secrecy, the sender
and the legitimate recipient share a secret key, which is used to encipher and decipher the message. It is rather
apparent from ordinary compression [2] that a necessary and sufficient condition for perfect secrecy is that the
available key rate is larger than the information rate required to compress the source (the entropy or rate-distortion
function of the source in case of lossless or lossy compression, respectively). Usually, the supply of key bits is a
limited resource, as they need to be transferred to the intended recipient via a completely secure channel. When
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2the key rate is less than the information rate, secrecy is traditionally measured in terms of equivocation, that is,
the conditional entropy of the message given the cryptogram. The use of equivocation as a secrecy measure was
advocated by other models of secrecy systems, which do not assume a shared key. Instead, secrecy is achieved by
the fact that the message intercepted by the eavesdropper is of lower quality than the one received by the legitimate
receiver. For example, in the ubiquitous wire-tap model [3], [4], the channel of the wiretapper is degraded (or more
noisy) with respect to (w.r.t.) the channel of the legitimate receiver. In the model of [5], [6], [7] the legitimate
recipient has better quality of side information than the eavesdropper.
The equivocation is indeed an unambiguous measure for statistical dependence when it is equal to either its
minimal value of zero (the random variables are deterministic functions of each other), or its maximal value of the
unconditional entropy (the two random variables are independent). Nonetheless, for partial secrecy, i.e., when the
equivocation takes values strictly between these two extremes, its operational meaning is disputable. Thus, in [8],
it was proposed to measure partial secrecy by the expected number of spurious messages that explain the given
cryptogram (which is somewhat equivalent to the probability of correctly decrypting the message). Later, in [9],
it was proposed to measure partial secrecy by the minimum average distortion that an eavesdropper can attain
(this was also considered previously, to some extent, in [10]). In addition, in [9] the possibility that the legitimate
recipient can tolerate a certain distortion level was also incorporated into the system model. In [9, Theorems 2 and
3], inner and outer bounds were obtained on the achievable trade-off between the coding rate, the key rate, and
distortion levels at the legitimate recipient and eavesdropper. However, in [11], it was revealed that this trade-off
is, in fact, degenerated. It was demonstrated there that in some cases, a negligible key rate can cause maximum
distortion at the eavesdropper. The following simple example (from [12, Section I.A]) demonstrates this: Consider
an memoryless source X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ {0, 1}n where P(Xi = 1) = 12 for i = 1, . . . n, and a single key bit U ,
shared by the two legitimate parties, where P(U = 1) = 12 . Suppose that the distortion measure at the eavesdropper
side is the Hamming distortion measure. Then, if the encrypted message is Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn), where Yi = Xi⊕U ,
then the distortion at the eavesdropper attains its maximal possible value of 12 , regardless of the estimate of the
eavesdropper. Nonetheless, such a secrecy is severely insecure. If the eavesdropper becomes aware of just a single
bit of the source, then it can decrypt the entire message. It was therefore proposed to consider models which are
more robust to assumptions concerning the eavesdropper. These models indeed lead to a non-degenerated trade-
off, that requires a positive key rate. In [12], [13] it was assumed that the eavesdropper’s estimation is performed
sequentially, and at the time it estimates the i-th symbol, it has noiseless/noisy estimates of all the previous message
symbols and the previous reproduced symbols (at the legitimate recipient), in addition to the public cryptogram. This
model was termed causal disclosure. It was justified by the scenario in which the sender and legitimate recipient
attempt to coordinate actions in a distributed system in order to maximize a certain payoff, and the eavesdropper
acts in order to minimize the payoff. In a different line of work [14], the eavesdropper produces a fixed-size list
(of exponential cardinality in the block-length), and the distortion is measured w.r.t. the reproduction word in the
list which attains the minimal distortion.
3However, the fact that the trade-off in [9] is degenerated can be attributed to the way that the distortion is
measured, rather than to the weakness of the eavesdropper. For a given strategy of the eavesdropper, the average
distortion, as assumed in [9], [12], [14], may be large due to message and key-bit combinations that lead to a very
large distortion, albeit with small probability. A more refined figure of merit would include the probability that the
distortion is less than some level, rather than the average distortion. Such a performance criterion is customary in
ordinary rate-distortion theory (e.g. the ǫ-fidelity criterion in [15, Chapter 7]). Indeed, in the above single key-bit
example, the eavesdropper can estimate the message exactly with probability 12 , irrespective of its length. Thus, for
any positive distortion level, the probability of an exiguous-distortion event is 12 , which is clearly unacceptable for
most applications.
For most source models, good estimation of the message at the eavesdropper should be a rare event, and finding
its exact probability is difficult. Instead, an asymptotic analysis can be carried in order to find the exponential
decrease rate (i.e. the exponent) of the correct decryption probability. The results of [10] can be considered as
a special case of this line of thought, for the restricted class of instantaneous encoders. In [10], the exponent of
decrypting the message by the eavesdropper was found as a function of the exponent of exiguous-distortion of the
estimation by the eavesdropper. For the same model, the exponent of the minimal probability of correct decryption
by the eavesdropper was found in [16]. Later, in [17] secrecy was defined in a large-deviations sense: A system
is considered secure if the exponent of the probability of the eavesdropper correctly decrypting the message is the
same with and without the cryptogram. This, in turn, required the analysis of the correct decryption probability. In
[10], [16], [17], it was assumed that the legitimate recipient must reproduce the message exactly (i.e., with zero
distortion).
In this paper, we adopt a similar large-deviations approach to measuring secrecy, using a distortion measure,
and generalize the results of [17]. For a memoryless source, we allow an imperfect reproduction at the legitimate
recipient, and measure distortion both at the legitimate recipient and at the eavesdropper using a large-deviations
measure. Specifically, we will define two exponents. First, for a given distortion level DL, the excess-distortion
exponent is defined in the usual way [15, Chapter 9], as the exponent of the probability that the distortion between
the legitimate recipient reproduction and the source sequence is larger than DL. Second, for a given distortion
level DE, we define the exiguous-distortion exponent as the exponent of the probability that the distortion between
the eavesdropper estimate and the source sequence is less than DE. We will derive the perfect secrecy exponent
function E∗e (DE), which is the exiguous-distortion exponent of the eavesdropper when it estimates the message
blindly, without the cryptogram (alternatively, for codes with unlimited key rate). It will be assumed that the
secrecy system has a limited coding rate RL, and that for a given distortion level DL, the excess-distortion exponent
must be larger than EL. Our main result is that under mild conditions on the compression constraints (RL,DL,EL),
the maximal achievable exiguous-distortion exponent is equal to the minimum between the key rate R, and E∗e (DE),
calculated at distortion level required by the eavesdropper DE. Since this maximal exiguous-distortion exponent
does not depend on (RL,DL,EL) (in the interesting domain of these parameters), such a result implies that as far as
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Figure 1. Two cases of ambiguity for the eavesdropper, for a single key bit code. Left side: Assume for simplicity that the source is
distributed uniformly over the dots encapsulated by the outermost circle. The two small solid line circles represent two reproduction cells,
which are mapped to the same cryptogram by the two possible values of the key bit u. The dashed larger circle represents all the source
block for which the distortion between the source block and the best estimate of the eavesdropper is less than DE. As can be seen, there
is a large exiguous-distortion probability. Right side: Under the same assumptions, in this case the two reproduction cells are far apart. The
best estimate of the eavesdropper can ‘cover’ at most one of the reproduction cells, and the exiguous-distortion probability is 1
2
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performance trade-offs are concerned, the compression and secrecy problems are essentially decoupled: The fact
that the message is required to be kept secret does not affect the compression performance. It should be stressed,
however, that this result does not imply a separation theorem from the operational point of view. The rate-distortion
code should be designed in a certain manner in order to provide secrecy, in contrast to, e.g., [9], [7], [18]. A
concatenation of an arbitrary good rate-distortion code, followed by encryption using the available key bits, does
not necessarily achieve a good exiguous-distortion exponent. For intuition, consider an ordinary rate-distortion code,
assume that one key bit is available, and that the distortion measures of the legitimate decoder and eavesdropper
are the same. The eavesdropper, in this case, knows that the reproduction of the legitimate decoder is one of two
possible reproductions (of equal probability). If these two reproductions are close, then it can approximate them
using a single reproduction, and achieve a distortion which may be only slightly larger than the distortion of the
legitimate decoder. If, however, the rate-distortion code is designed in such a way that these two reproductions
are sufficiently far apart, then the eavesdropper will have a poor compromise between them, and will achieve
high distortion. This is illustrated in Figure 1. More generally, unlike ordinary rate-distortion codes, in which the
performance is determined only by the reproduction cells, and the way in which the reproduction cells are mapped
to transmitted bits is immaterial, here, the latter will be crucial for the security performance.
To show this result, we will prove both achievability (lower bound on the exiguous-distortion exponent) and a
matching converse (upper bound). In the achievability part, we will demonstrate the existence of a secrecy system
in which the compression constraints are satisfied, and it has a fixed key rate R. For this secrecy system, the best
5strategy of the eavesdropper will be either to (1) guess the secret key and reproduce the message as a legitimate
recipient (using the cryptogram), or (2) blindly estimate the message. The secrecy system constructed will also be
universal in the following two senses. First, it does not require the knowledge of the source statistics, as long it
is a memoryless source. Second, it is not designed for a specific value of DE, yet the exiguous-distortion exponent
min{R, E∗e (DE)} will be achieved for any value of DE, by the same sequence of codes, as long as DE ≥ DL. As a
converse, we will show that even if variable key rate is allowed, yet with average key rate less than R, then the
exiguous-distortion exponent cannot be larger than min{R, E∗e (DE)}. The results of [17] are essentially recovered
from our results, as a special case with DL = DE = 0. We also remark that in our model, the distortion measures
of the legitimate recipient and the eavesdropper can be different, as long as they satisfy a certain relationship.
Finally, we briefly mention a related work in which large-deviations aspects were also incorporated. In [19],
the guessing model of [20], [21] was relaxed to allow, after a maximum of possible guesses has passed, a small
probability of large distortion for the eavesdropper. To analyze the asymptotic limits of the system, the excess-
distortion exponent of the eavesdropper was restricted, and the maximal normalized logarithm of the number of
guesses was found1. However, in our model, no testing mechanism is assumed to be available to the eavesdropper,
which allows it to validate its estimate.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we establish notation conventions, and in Section
III, we formulate the problem. In Section IV, we present our main theorem, and discuss its implications. In Section
V, we provide the outline and the main ideas of the proof. The proof of the main theorem appears in Section VI.
II. NOTATION CONVENTIONS
Throughout the paper, random variables will be denoted by capital letters, specific values they may take will
be denoted by the corresponding lower case letters, and their alphabets will be denoted by calligraphic letters.
Random vectors and their realizations will be denoted, respectively, by capital letters and the corresponding lower
case letters, both in the bold face font. Their alphabets will be superscripted by their dimensions. For example, the
random vector X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) (n positive integer), may take a specific vector value x = (x1, . . . , xn) in X n,
the nth order Cartesian power of X , which is the alphabet of each component of this vector. For any given vector
x, we will also denote xji = (xi, . . . , xj) for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n, and use the shorthand x
j
1 = x
j
.
We will follow the standard notation conventions for probability distributions, e.g., PX(x) will denote the
probability of the letter x ∈ X under the distribution PX . The arguments will be omitted when we address
the entire distribution, e.g., PX . Similarly, generic distributions will be denoted by Q, Q∗, and in other forms,
subscripted by the relevant random variables/vectors/conditionings, e.g. QXZ , QX|Z . Whenever clear from context,
these subscripts will be omitted. An exceptional case will be the ‘hat’ notation. For this notation, Qˆx will denote
1Reference [19] is a one page abstract, and contains only a description of the problem. The results were not published, but a detailed
version of [19] can be found in [22]. However, we believe that the achievability results provided in [22] are not actually proven. Specifically,
in the achievability proof, no system is actually constructed, and the claims about the expected number of guesses of the eavesdropper are
made on any given secrecy system. Obviously, there are, particularly bad, secrecy systems, in which a single guess suffices to find the
message exactly.
6the empirical distribution of a vector x ∈ X n, i.e., the vector of relative frequencies Qˆx(x) of each symbol x ∈ X
in x. The type class of x ∈ X n, which will be denoted by Tn(Qˆx), is the set of all vectors x′ with Qˆx′ = Qˆx. The
set of all type classes of vectors of length n over X will be denoted by Pn(X ), and the set of all possible types
over X will be denoted by P(X ) ,
⋃∞
n=1Pn(X ). Similar notation for type classes will also be used for generic
types QX ∈ P(X ), i.e., Tn(QX) will denote the set of all vectors x with Qˆx = QX . In the same manner, the
empirical distribution of a pair of vectors (x, z) will be denoted by Qˆxz and the joint type class will be denoted
by Tn(Qˆxz). The joint type classes over the Cartesian product alphabet X × Z will be denoted by Pn(X × Z),
and P(X ×Z) ,
⋃∞
n=1Pn(X ×Y). For a joint type QXZ ∈ P(X ×Z), Tn(QXZ) will denote the set of all pairs
of vectors (x, z) with Qˆxz = QXZ . The conditional type class, namely, the set {x′ : Qˆx′z = Qˆxz}, will be denoted
by Tn(Qˆx|z, z), or more generally Tn(QX|Z , z) for a generic empirical conditional probability distribution QX|Z .
The probability simplex for X will be denoted by Q(X ), and the simplex for the alphabet X ×Z will be denoted
by Q(X × Z). Similar notations will be used for triplets of random variables.
For two distributions PX , QX over the same finite alphabet X , we will denote the variational distance (L1 norm)
by
||PX −QX ||,
∑
x∈X
|PX(x)−QX(x)|. (1)
When optimizing a function of a distribution QX over the entire probability simplex Q(X ), the explicit display of the
constraint will be omitted. For example, for a function f(Q), we will write minQ f(Q) instead of minQ∈Q(X ) f(Q).
The same will hold for optimization of a function of a distribution QXZ over the probability simplex Q(X × Z),
and for similar optimizations.
The expectation operator w.r.t. a given distribution, e.g., QXZ , will be denoted by EQ[·] where, the subscript
QXZ will be omitted if the underlying probability distribution is clear from the context. In general, information-
theoretic quantities will be denoted by the standard notation [23], with subscript indicating the distribution of the
relevant random variables, e.g. HQ(X|Z), IQ(X;Z), IQ(X;Z|W ), under Q = QXZW . For notational convenience,
the entropy of X under Q will be denoted both by HQ(X) and H(QX), depending on the context. The binary
entropy function will be denoted by hB(q) for 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. The information divergence between two distributions,
e.g. PX and QX , will be denoted by D(PX ||QX). In all information measures above, the distribution may also be
an empirical distribution, for example, H(Qˆx), D(Qˆx||PX) and so on.
We will denote the Hamming distance between two vectors, x ∈ X n and z ∈ X n, by dH(x, z). The length of
a string b will be denoted by |b|, the concatenation of strings b1, b2, . . . will be denoted by (b1, b2, . . .), and the
empty string will be denoted by φ. We will denote the complement of a set A by Ac, and its interior by int(A).
For a finite set A, we will denote its cardinality by |A|. The probability of the event A will be denoted by P(A),
and I(A) will denote its indicator function.
For two positive sequences, {an} and {bn} the notation an
.
= bn, will mean asymptotic equivalence in the
exponential scale, that is, limn→∞ 1n log(
an
bn
) = 0. Similarly, an
·
≤ bn will mean lim supn→∞ 1n log(
an
bn
) ≤ 0, and
7so on. The ceiling function will be denoted by ⌈·⌉. The notation [t]+ will stand for max{t, 0}. For two integers,
a, b, we denote by a mod b the modulo of a w.r.t. b. Logarithms and exponents will be understood to be taken to
the binary base.
Throughout, we will ignore integer code length constraints for the sake of simplicity, as they do not have
any effect on the results. For example, instead of ⌈nR⌉ bits we will write nR bits. For a given finite ordered
set, A = {a1, . . . ,a|A|}, we will denote by B[a; log|A|] the binary representation of the index of a in A, i.e.
B[a; log|A|] = i if a = ai, for i = 1, . . . |A|.
In general, the subscript ‘L’ will be used for quantities related to the legitimate decoder, and the subscript ‘E’
will be used for eavesdropper-related quantities.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Let the source vector X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) be formed by n independent copies of a random variable X ∈ X ,
where X is a finite alphabet, and Xi is distributed according to PX(x) = P(X = x). Let W and Z be finite
reproduction alphabets. In addition, let {Ui}∞i=1 be a sequence of purely random bits (i.e. a Bernoulli process with
P(Ui = 1) =
1
2 ), independent of the source X.
A secure rate-distortion code Sn = (fn, ϕn) of block-length n is defined by a key-length function kn : X n → Z+,
which assigns a key length kn(x) to every x ∈ X n, an encoder fn : X n × {0, 1}∗ → Yn, which generates
a cryptogram, y = fn(x,u), where u = (u1, . . . , ukn(x)), and where Yn is a finite alphabet2, and a legitimate
decoder ϕn : Yn ×{0, 1}∗ →Wn, which generates a reproduction w = ϕn(y,u)3. A sequence of codes {Sn}n≥1,
indexed by the block-length n, is denoted by S . The performance of the legitimate decoder is evaluated by a
distortion measure dL : X × W → R+, where without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.), it is assumed that for every
x ∈ X , there exists w ∈ W such that dL(x,w) = 0. Also, with a slight abuse of notation, the distortion between x
and w is defined as the average,
dL(x,w) ,
1
n
n∑
i=1
dL(xi, wi). (2)
We say that S satisfies a compression constraint (RL,DL,EL), if the coding rate satisfies4
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log|Yn|≤ RL, (3)
and for any given {Ui}∞i=1 = {ui}∞i=1 the excess-distortion exponent, at distortion level DL, is larger than EL for
the legitimate decoder, i.e.5
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
P [dL(X, ϕn(fn(X,u),u)) ≥ DL] ≥ EL. (4)
2This alphabet need not be the nth order Cartesian power of some alphabet Y .
3It is implicit in the definition of the encoder and decoder that both are aware of the key-length kn(x). Specifically, one can define an
inverse-key length function ln : Yn × {0, 1}∗ → Z+, which reproduces the key-length at the decoder side, i.e. kn(x) = ln(y, {ui}∞i=1).
4This constraint can be weakened to a constraint on the normalized entropy of the cryptogram. See discussion in Section IV.
5This constraint can be weakened to be only satisfied for an excess-distortion probability averaged over {Ui}∞i=1. See discussion in Section
IV.
8Note that for a zero excess-distortion exponent EL = 0+, this requirement implies that an average-distortion
constraint6 E [dL(X,W)] ≤ DL is also satisfied. An eavesdropper decoder is a function σn : Yn → Zn, where
z = σn(y) is the estimate of the eavesdropper. It is assumed that the eavesdropper has full knowledge of all system
properties: The source statistics, the encoder (fn, kn), and the legitimate decoder ϕn. The set of all eavesdropper
decoders for a block-length n is denoted by Σn. In what follows, we also consider genie-aided eavesdropper
decoders, which are aware of the type class of the source block, i.e., σ˜n : Yn × Pn → X n, and in this case, the
estimate of the decoder is z = σ˜n(y, Qˆx). The set of all genie-aided eavesdropper decoders of block-length n is
denoted by Σ˜n.
The performance of the eavesdropper is evaluated by a distortion measure dE : X ×Z → R+, where again, it is
assumed that for every x ∈ X , there exists z ∈ Z such that dE(x, z) = 0. As before, the distortion between x and
z is defined as
dE(x, z) ,
1
n
n∑
i=1
dE(xi, zi). (5)
For a given DE ≥ 0, the exiguous-distortion probability, for a given code Sn, is denoted by
pd(Sn,DE) , max
σn∈Σn
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE] . (6)
The limit inferior exiguous-distortion exponent, achieved for a sequence of codes S , is defined as
E−d (S,DE) , lim infn→∞
−
1
n
log pd(Sn,DE), (7)
and the limit superior exiguous-distortion exponent achieved, E+d (S,DE), is defined analogously, with limit superior
replacing the limit inferior. While, E−d (S,DE) ≤ E
+
d (S,DE), it is guaranteed that pd(sn,DE)≥˙ exp
[
−nE−d (S,DE)
]
for all sufficiently large block-lengths, while pd(sn,DE)
.
= exp
[
−nE+d (S,DE)
]
may hold only for some sub-
sequence of block-lengths. Thus, E−d (S,DE) is less sensitive to the choice of the block-length. For a given QX ∈
P(X ), let nl = n0l, l = 1, 2, . . ., be the sub-sequence of block-lengths such that Tn(QX) is non-empty, where
n0 is the minimal such block-length. We define, with a slight abuse of notation, the conditional limit inferior
exiguous-distortion exponent as
E−d (S,DE, QX) , lim infl→∞
−
1
nl
log max
σnl∈Σnl
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tnl(QX)] , (8)
and E+d (S,DE, QX) is defined analogously.
The key rate of x ∈ X n is defined as rn(x) , 1n |kn(x)|. A code is termed a fixed key rate code of rate R0
6Indeed, suppose that P (dL(X, ϕn(fn(X,u),u)) ≥ DL) decays to zero for all {ui}∞i=1 , but only sub-exponentially. Assuming dL ,
minw∈W maxx∈X dL(x,w) <∞, for any δ > 0 and all n sufficiently large
E [dL(X,W)] ≤ DL · P [dL(X, ϕn(fn(X,u),u)) ≤ DL] + dL · P [dL(X, ϕn(fn(X,u),u)) ≤ DL]
≤ DL + dL · P [dL(X, ϕn(fn(X,u),u)) ≤ DL]
≤ DL + δ.
9if rn(x) = R0 for all x ∈ X n, otherwise, it is called a variable key rate code, and it has an average key rate
E[rn(X)]. We define the conditional key rate of QX ∈ P(X ) as
R(S, QX) , lim
l→∞
E[rnl(X)|X ∈ Tnl(QX)] (9)
whenever the limit exist.
The rate-distortion function of a memoryless source QX , under the distortion measure dL(·, ·) is denoted by
RL(QX ,DL) , min
QW |X :EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL
IQ(X;W ) (10)
and, similarly, the rate-distortion function of QX under the distortion measure dE(·, ·) is denoted by RE(QX ,DE).
The main result of this paper, in Theorem 1, is a single-letter formula for the largest achievable exiguous-distortion
exponent for codes under a compression constraint (RL,DL,EL) and limited key rate.
IV. MAIN RESULT
The achievability part will be proved using fixed key rate codes, but in the converse part, we will allow also
variable key rate codes, that satisfy the following assumptions:
1) Upper bound on the key rate: As kn(x) = n log |X | key-bits are always sufficient to perfectly encrypt the
source, even without distortion, it will be assumed that kn(x) ≤ n log |X | for all x ∈ X n.
2) Uniform convergence of the conditional key rate: We assume that for every QX ∈ P(X ), conditioned on
X ∈ Tn(QX), the key rate rn(X) converges in probability to R(S, QX), and moreover, this convergence is
uniform over P(X ). Namely, for any δ > 0
max
QX∈Pn(X )
P
[∣∣rn(X)−R(S, QX)∣∣ > δ|X ∈ Tn(QX)] −−−→
n→∞
0. (11)
It is easy to prove that since 0 ≤ rn(X) ≤ log|X | with probability 1, then uniform convergence in the mean
(L1 norm) is also satisfied, and the limit in (9) exists, uniformly over QX ∈ P(X ).
3) Admissible encoders: An encoder fn will be termed admissible, if u 6= u′ implies that fn(x,u) 6= fn(x,u′)
for all x ∈ X n. We assume that fn is an admissible encoder.
In addition, we make two more assumptions. These assumptions are inessential, and are only made in order
to simplify the exposition of our results.
4) Upper bound on the legitimate excess-distortion exponent: It is well known [15, Theorem 9.5],[24], that for
a given DL, if
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log|Yn|≥ RL (12)
then there exist a sequence of codes S which satisfies the compression constraint (RL,DL,EL) iff
EL ≤ EL(PX ,DL,RL) , inf
QX :RL(QX ,DL)>RL
D(QX ||PX), (13)
10
where EL(PX ,DL,RL) is known as Marton’s source coding exponent. It will be assumed that the required
excess-distortion exponent at the legitimate decoder is strictly positive and not larger than Marton’s exponent,
i.e., 0 < EL ≤ EL(PX ,DL,RL).
5) Partial ordering between distortion measures: The distortion measure dE(·, ·) will be termed more lenient
than dL(·, ·), if for every w ∈ Wn, there exists z ∈ Zn such that
{x ∈ X n : dL(x,w) ≤ D} ⊆ {x ∈ X
n : dE(x, z) ≤ D} , (14)
for every D ≥ 0. This corresponds to a worst case assumption regarding the distortion measure (and the
reproduction alphabet Z) used by the eavesdropper - it is at least not more demanding than the distortion
measure used by the legitimate decoder. In addition, this also puts, in some sense, the distortion levels at
the legitimate decoder and at the eavesdropper decoder, on the same scale. Therefore, it will be assumed
that DE ≥ DL, namely, the distortion level allowed by the eavesdropper is larger than the one allowed by the
legitimate decoder. It is also easily verified that this assumption implies
RE(QX ,D) ≤ RL(QX ,D) (15)
for every D > 0.
We denote by
E∗e (DE) , min
QX
{D(QX ||PX) +RE(QX ,DE)} (16)
the perfect-secrecy exponent. Using standard method of types, it can be shown that this is the maximal exiguous-
distortion exponent that can be achieved when the eavesdropper blindly estimates the source, i.e. without using the
cryptogram. Alternatively, as evident from Theorem 1, this is the maximal exponent for unlimited key rate. We are
now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 1. Let δ > 0 be given. Then, there exists a sequence of codes S of fixed key rate R, which satisfies a
compression constraint (RL + δ,DL,EL) and properties 1-5 above,
E−d (S,DE) ≥ min {R, E
∗
e (DE)} − δ (17)
for all DE ≥ DL. Conversely, for every sequence of codes S of average key rate E[rn(x)] ≤ R for all n, which
satisfies a compression constraint (RL,DL,EL) and properties 1-5 above,
E+d (S,DE) ≤ min {R, E
∗
e (DE)} (18)
for all DE ≥ DL.
Section VI is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1, and here we discuss its implications. The main implication
of this theorem is that the performance of lossy compression and encryption are essentially decoupled. Note that
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in Theorem 1, the exiguous-distortion exponent of the eavesdropper is determined solely by the key rate and
the distortion level DE at the eavesdropper, and not by the compression constraint (RL,DL,EL) (as long as the
assumptions hold). Specifically, it holds for DL = 0, which means that increasing DL does not increase DE. In other
words, reducing the amount of information sent to the legitimate decoder cannot improve secrecy. Nonetheless, on
a positive note, as long as R ≤ E∗e (DE), the maximal secrecy can be attained, for every DE ≥ DL, without affecting
the compression performance. In addition, note that in Theorem 1, DE has a special stature: A single sequence of
codes S is universal for all DE ≥ DL. This enables the construction of secure rate-distortion codes that are robust
to the choice of DE, which may be unspecified when designing the system.
As previously mentioned, the achievability part of Theorem 1 is proved using fixed rate codes. Since fixed rate
codes clearly satisfy the second assumption above, the maximal exiguous-distortion exponent is fully characterized
for fixed key rate coding. Furthermore, the theorem shows that variable key rate codes, from the class of codes
which satisfy the above assumptions, offer no advantage over fixed key rate codes in terms of exiguous-distortion
exponent. This is in contrast to similar problems (variable-rate channel coding with feedback [25], [26], variable-rate
Slepian-Wolf coding [27]), where the more lenient average-rate constraint allows to increase the error exponent. It
should be mentioned that while the class of variable key rate codes is restricted to satisfy uniform convergence in
probability of the conditional key rate (see the second assumption above), the important class of type dependent
variable key rate codes satisfy this assumption. In a type dependent variable key rate code, the key rate rn(x)
depends on x only via its type, namely, Qˆx = Qˆx˜ implies rn(x) = rn(x˜) = ρ(QX) for some key rate function
ρ(·) : P(X ) → R+. Due to the symmetry of source blocks from the same type class, such a key rate allocation is
indeed plausible, and also practically motivated due to its simplicity. Such codes trivially satisfy the convergence
requirement, and so the converse part of Theorem 1 is valid.
Theorem 1 essentially generalizes [17, Theorem 1]. In [17], it was assumed that all alphabets are identical
X = W = Z , and that DE = DL = 0. Thus, the legitimate decoder need to perfectly reproduce the source block,
and the eavesdropper performance is measured by its probability of correct estimate, i.e.
pd(Sn,DE) = max
σn∈Σn
P(X = Z). (19)
Note also that for this specific case, the perfect-secrecy exponent for this case is given by
E∗e (DE) = min
QX
{D(QX ||PX) +H(QX)} (20)
= − log max
x∈X
PX(x). (21)
Indeed, even without using the cryptogram, the eavesdropper can choose z = (x∗, . . . , x∗) where x∗ = maxx∈X PX(x),
and achieve E∗e (DE).
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V. OUTLINE OF THE PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Since the proof of Theorem 1 is considerably involved, this section is devoted to an informal description of the
structure and the main ideas in this proof. Hopefully, this will facilitate the reading of the formal proof, or at least
give the reader an idea of the main highlights.
To begin, we observe, in Subsection VI-A, that the exiguous-distortion exponent remains unchanged even if
the eavesdropper is aware of the type of the source block Qˆx. This enables us to first, consider each type of the
source separately, and only then incorporate all types simultaneously, both in the achievability and the converse
parts. Next, in Subsection VI-B, we provide a technique which facilitates the construction of secure rate-distortion
codes, such that in view of the eavesdropper the cryptograms are symmetric. The idea is to cover a type class
Tn(QX) using an essentially minimal number of permutations of a constituent set Dn ⊆ Tn(QX). To wit, if
Dn , {x(0), . . . ,x(|Dn|−1)} then for any permutation π over {1, . . . , n}, we define
π(Dn) , {π(x(0)), . . . , π(x(|Dn|−1))} , (22)
and then find a set of permutations {πn,t}κnt=0 such that
κn⋃
t=0
πn,t(Dn) = Tn(QX), (23)
where κn is asymptotically close to its minimal value of |Tn(QX)||Dn| . For ordinary rate-distortion, such covering lemma
can be used to show the existence of a good rate-distortion code (e.g. instead of [15, Lemma 9.1]). Let us define,
the D-cover of w ∈ Wn as
D(w, QX ,DL) , {x ∈ Tn(QX) : dL(x,w) ≤ DL} . (24)
If we set Dn = D(w, QX ,DL) and find permutations {πn,t}κnt=0 such that (23) holds, then the set Cˆn , {πn,t(w)}κnt=0
is a rate-distortion code such that for every x ∈ Tn(QX) there exists w ∈ Cˆn such that dL(x,w) ≤ DL. Such
permutations can be found for all types of the source, and using the method of types, it can be verified that Marton’s
source coding exponent can be achieved by such a construction. For the construction of secure rate-distortion codes,
we will use permutations of more complicated sets to cover the type.
The achievability part (lower bound) is proved in Subsection VI-C using codes of fixed key rate R. Let us
first focus on a single type QX . For the legitimate decoder, a source block x ∈ Tn(QX) is reproduced by some
w ∈ Cn ,
{
ϕn(y,u) : y ∈ Yn,u ∈ {0, 1}
nR
}
, which satisfies dL(x,w) ≤ DL, unless no such w exists. The
compression constraint (RL,DL,EL) ensures that large-distortion reproduction occurs with an exponentially decaying
probability. The eavesdropper, on the other hand, reproduces using only the cryptogram y. With a slight abuse of
notation of (24), let us define, for a given the D-cover of Cn ⊆ Wn as
D(Cn, QX ,DL) ,
⋃
w∈Cn
D(w, QX ,DL). (25)
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When the eavesdropper observes y, it knows that the legitimate decoder will reproduce w from the set Cn(y) ={
ϕn(y,u) : u ∈ {0, 1}
nR
}
of size |Cn(y)|= 2nR. Furthermore, conditioning on the cryptogram y and the type QX ,
the source block X is distributed uniformly over D(Cn(y), QX ,DL). The proof of achievability is divided into
three steps. In the first step (Lemma 7), we demonstrate the existence of a good and secure rate-distortion code
conditioned on a single cryptogram, in the second step, we extend this code for an entire type class Tn(QX)
(Lemma 9), and in the third step, we extend it to all types.
In more detail, the first step of the proof (Lemma 7) shows, by a random selection mechanism, that there
exists a set C∗n of size 2nR such that when X is distributed uniformly over D(C∗n, QX ,DL), the exiguous-distortion
probability of any eavesdropper is asymptotically not larger than 2−n·min{R,RE(QX ,DE)}. Geometrically, this implies
that the D-covers for w ∈ Cn are distant from each other, under dE(·, ·). Thus, a secure rate-distortion code satisfying
Cn(y) = C
∗
n for some cryptogram y, will have a good conditional exiguous-distortion probability given y.
In the second step, we define the code for all x ∈ Tn(QX), using a symmetry argument. Observe that the
distortion measures of both the legitimate and eavesdropper decoders are invariant to permutations (see (2) and
(5)). Thus, D(π(Cn), QX ,DL) = π (D(Cn, QX ,DL)), and the exiguous-distortion probability for an eavesdropper
when X is distributed uniformly over π (D(Cn, QX ,DL)) is the same as for D(Cn, QX ,DL). In Lemma 9, we use a
minimal number of permutations (from Subsection VI-B) of a good D-cover D(C∗n, QX ,DL) to cover Tn(QX), and
then obtain a good secure rate-distortion code for all Tn(QX). There is a certain subtlety in the proof of Lemma
9. For an ordinary rate-distortion code, there might be more than a single w ∈ Cn such that dL(x,w) ≤ DL. From
the excess-distortion probability point of view, there is no importance to which one of these {w} will reproduce
x. However, this might result in w ∈ Cn for which only a small portion of D(w, QX ,DL) is actually reproduced
by w (as x ∈ D(w, QX ,DL) might be reproduced by some w′ ∈ Cn which also satisfies dL(x,w) ≤ DL), which
might be harmful for secrecy purposes. Indeed, the secure rate-distortion code is constructed in Lemma 9 with
the will that conditioned on any cryptogram y, the source is distributed uniformly over D(C∗n, QX ,DL). But, since
a source block must eventually be reproduced by a single w, then conditioned on some of the cryptograms y,
the source block will be distributed on a smaller set than D(C∗n, QX ,DL). For such cryptograms, the conditional
exiguous-distortion probability of the eavesdropper might be large. Lemma 9 shows that if the efficient covering
described above is utilized, then the total effect of such events is negligible.
Until this stage, we have constructed a code for Tn(QX) with appropriate conditional exiguous-distortion ex-
ponent. As we shall see, in the construction of Lemma 7 and Lemma 9, the convergence of probabilities to their
asymptotic exponent is not necessarily uniform (cf. Remark 8). In the third step of the achievability proof, we prove
that uniform convergence is possible, using an elaborated construction, built from the previous one. The idea is to
consider a dense grid on the simplex Q(X ), and construct a secure rate-distortion code, as in Lemma 9, for each
of the types in the grid. Since the of number of types in the grid is finite, then uniform convergence is assured
for types in the grid. If the type of the source block belongs to the grid, then one of the constructed codes is
used, according to its type. Otherwise, the source block will be first modified, such that the modified source block
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does have type within the grid, which is not very far from the type of the original source block. The modified
source block will then be encoded using one of the codes of the grid, and thus will have both low legitimate
excess-distortion probability, and large exiguous-distortion probability for the eavesdropper. It will be shown that
the overheads required for the legitimate decoder to reproduce the original source block, rather than the modified
source block are negligible.
In Subsection VI-D, we prove the converse part in two steps. Recall that in general, for any given type QX ∈
P(X ), we have defined the average rate R(S, QX), but we allow each source block x ∈ Tn(QX) to have a different
key rate rn(x) ∈ [0, logn|X |]. In addition, for a code satisfying the compression constraint (RL,DL,EL), and type
QX such that D(QX ||PX) ≤ EL, the legitimate excess-distortion probability must decay to zero exponentially as
2−n[EL−D(QX ||PX)] but does not need to be strictly zero. In the first step of the proof of the converse, we prove
a lemma that shows that the optimal limit superior exiguous-distortion exponent is not deteriorated, if we restrict
rn(x) to be a constant within Tn(QX), which is less than R(S, QX) + δ, and also restrict the legitimate excess-
distortion probability to be exactly zero. It will be easier to prove a converse for codes with such properties, as
will be done in the second step of the proof. In the second step, we assume the structure of the code from the first
step, and evaluate the performance of an eavesdropper which adopts one of the following two simple strategies:
(1) It can guess the secret key bits, and then decode using these bits just like the legitimate decoder. (2) It can
ignore the cryptogram altogether and choose an estimate z ∈ Zn, based on only Qˆx. Clearly, in the first case, the
probability of success is 2−nR, and it is not difficult to show that the exiguous-distortion probability for the second
strategy is asymptotically 2−nE∗e (DE). This implies the upper bound (18). We remark that the asymptotic optimality
of these two simple strategies (sometimes called key-attack and blind guessing, respectively) can also be found to
some extent in related problems [14], [21], [22].
We conclude the outline of the proof with the following comments:
• Awareness of key-length: Since the number of possible key-lengths is n log|X |, it can be compressed and
fully encrypted using negligible coding rate and key rate of 1n log(n log|X |) bits, and it can be assumed
that the exiguous-distortion exponent is not deteriorated if the eavesdropper is aware of the key-length (as
in Subsection VI-A). Thus, in the converse proof, we could have found the exiguous-distortion exponent
conditioned on both the type and the key-length, and then average over them. The main obstacle in this
approach is proving the second property (full type covering) assured in Lemma 13. To show this property
using the methods of Lemma 13, would require showing that the subsets of the type classes of fixed key-
length, i.e., T˜n(QX ,m) , Tn(QX) ∩ {x : kn(x) = m} for some 0 ≤ m ≤ n log|X |, can cover a type class
by essentially a minimal number of permutations, as in Lemma 4 (Subsection VI-B). However, in turn, the
proof of Lemma 4 is based on the fact that Tn(QX) is invariant to permutations, which may not hold for
T˜n(QX ,m).
• Full type covering: Let QX ∈ P(X ) be given such that D(QX ||PX) < EL. The method of types and the
expression (13) reveal that to satisfy the compression constraint (RL,DL,EL), the following condition should
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hold for any given {ui}∞i=1
P [dL(X, ϕn(fn(X,u),u)) > DL|X ∈ Tn(QX)]
.
= 2−n[EL−D(QX ||PX)]. (26)
For ordinary rate-distortion codes, it is well known7 that if for a given ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and for all n sufficiently
large
P [dL(X,W) > DL] ≤ 1− ǫ (27)
then there exists a rate-distortion code with almost the same rate, such that
P [dL(X,W) > DL] = 0. (28)
Thus, to ensure an exponent constraint EL for ordinary rate-distortion codebook, the type classes of types
which are ‘close’ enough to PX (in the divergence sense) should be almost covered by the reproduction set
(26), but in fact, can be fully covered by the reproduction set (28). Then, the minimal rate required to satisfy
(26) is the same as the minimal rate to satisfy (28), and the compression rate cannot be decreased due to the
softer requirement in (26). By contrast, in the presence of the eavesdropper, it might happen that the softer
requirement in (26) can lead to better exiguous-distortion exponent: Even if a type class can be fully covered
using the available coding rate, perhaps the exiguous-distortion exponent can be improved if some of the
source blocks are reproduced with distortion larger than DL, but this occurs with sufficiently small probability,
as in (26). Lemma 13 shows that this is not the case.
• Compression constraint conditions: The conditions required to satisfy the coding rate constraint (3), and the
excess-distortion exponent constraint for the legitimate decoder (4) can be weakened without affecting Theorem
1. First, (3) can be weakened to
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(Y ) ≤ RL, (29)
where H(Y ) is the entropy of the cryptogram. Second, the excess-distortion exponent can be weakened to
apply to the expectation constraint over the key-bits {Ui}∞i=1, rather than for every given {ui}∞i=1, i.e.
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
P [dL(X, ϕn(fn(X,U),U)) ≥ DL] ≥ EL. (30)
Obviously, since the achievability part is proved using the stronger conditions (3) and (4), it also holds under
the weaker conditions (29) and (30). For the converse, note that in Lemma 13 and in the proof of the converse,
the coding rate is essentially not constrained. The excess-distortion exponent constraint is used in the converse
proof only in eq. (255), which follows directly from the weaker condition (30). Therefore, the achievability
part holds under the strong conditions, and the converse part holds under the weak conditions.
• Legitimate excess-distortion exponent: As is evident from Theorem 1, there is no improvement in the exiguous-
7This can also be easily verified using Lemma 4.
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distortion exponent even if EL vanishes (to wit, the distortion DL is achieved only on the average). Thus, the
excess-distortion exponent can be set to its maximal value of EL(PX ,DL,RL), as defined in (13).
• Dependency on the source distribution: From the proof of the achievability, it is evident that given Qˆx, the
operation of the encoder, the legitimate decoder and the eavesdropper decoder depend on PX only on whether
RL > RL(Qˆx,DL) or not (equivalently, from the previous comment, whether D(QX ||PX) ≤ EL or not). Since
it can be assumed that Qˆx is known to all parties, then prior knowledge of the source distribution PX is
not required to either party. Hence, the secure rate-distortion codes constructed are universal. Of course, the
exponents achieved depend on PX .
VI. PROOF OF THE THEOREM 1
We remind the reader the reverse Markov inequality [28, Section 9.3, p. 159], which is a useful tool for the
proof.
Lemma 2. Let X be a positive random variable which satisfies P(X ≤ αE[X]) = 1 for some α > 1. Then, for
any β < 1,
P (X > βE[X]) ≥
1− β
α− β
. (31)
The proof is based on the ordinary Markov inequality for the positive random variable X˜ = αE[X] −X.
A. Type Awareness of the Eavesdropper
Consider the following simple observation, which simplifies later derivations: The largest achievable exiguous-
distortion exponent is not deteriorated if the eavesdropper is aware of the type of the source block, in addition to
the cryptogram.
Proposition 3. For any QX ∈ P(X )
E−d (S,DE, QX) = lim infn→∞
{
−
1
n
max
σn∈Σ˜n
log P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)]
}
. (32)
An analogous result holds for E+d (S,DE, QX).
Proof: Since Σn ⊂ Σ˜n
E−d (S,DE, QX) ≥ lim infn→∞
{
−
1
n
log max
σn∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)]
}
. (33)
To show equality, let {σ˜∗n ∈ Σ˜n} be the sequence of decoders which achieve the maximum in the right hand side
of (33). Let us define a sequence of decoders {σn ∈ Σn} as follows. First, σn produces a random guess Q ∈ Pn
of the type of the source, with the uniform distribution over Pn, and second, it decodes
σn(y) = σ˜
∗
n(y,Q). (34)
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Given QX ∈ P, the resulting conditional exiguous-distortion probability is given by
P [dE(X, σn(Y )) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)] (35)
≥ P
[
dE(X, σ˜
∗
n(Y,Q)) ≤ DE|Q = Qˆx,X ∈ Tn(QX)
]
· P
[
Q = Qˆx|X ∈ Tn(QX)
]
(36)
= P
[
dE(X, σ˜
∗
n(Y, Qˆx)) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)
]
·
1
|Pn|
(37)
and as |Pn|≤ (n+ 1)|X |, equality is achieved in (33).
B. Covering a Type Class via Permutations
In this subsection, we discuss the possibility to cover a type class by means of permutations of a constituent
subset. The fact that the distortion measure of the eavesdropper is invariant to permutations of both arguments hints
on the usefulness of such a covering in the construction of good secure rate-distortion codes.
Given a type QX ∈ P(X ) and δ > 0, the method of types implies that for n > n0(δ, |X |)
2n[H(QX)−δ] ≤ |Tn(QX)|≤ 2
nH(QX). (38)
Now, consider the subset Dn ⊂ Tn(QX), where the elements of Dn are distinct. We say that a set of permutations
{πn,t}
κn
t=0 cover Tn(QX) if
κn⋃
t=0
πn,t(Dn) = Tn(QX), (39)
where πn,t(Dn) means that the same permutation πn,t(·) operates on all x ∈ Dn, as defined in (22). Let κ∗n be the
minimal number of permutations of Dn required to cover Tn(QX). By a simple counting argument, we must have
κ∗n ≥
|Tn(QX)|
|Dn|
. (40)
The following lemma guaranteed the existence of a cover which essentially achieves the lower bound.
Lemma 4 ([29, Section 6, Covering Lemma 2]). For every Dn ⊂ Tn(QX), QX ∈ Pn(X )
κ∗n ≤
|Tn(QX)|
|Dn|
· log|Tn(QX)|. (41)
The main application of this lemma is for a sequence of sets {Dn}∞n=1. Let nl be the sequence of block-lengths
such that Tnl(QX) is non-empty, and let Dnl ⊂ Tnl(QX) such that
|Dnl |
.
= 2nlR˜. (42)
Then, Lemma 4 implies that for every δ > 0 and l ≥ l0(δ, |X |) both
κ∗nl ≥
2nl[H(QX)−δ]
2nl(R˜+δ)
(43)
= 2nl[H(QX)−R˜−2δ] (44)
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from (40) and
κ∗nl ≤
2nlH(QX)
2nl(R˜−δ)
nl [H(QX) + δ] (45)
≤ 2nl[H(QX)−R˜+2δ] (46)
from Lemma 4. Thus, the cover is asymptotically efficient, and this implies that the permuted sets cannot overlap too
much. To further explore this property, let {πnl,t}
κ∗nl
t=0 be the permutations constructed in Lemma 4 for block-length
nl, and define the exclusive permutations sets as
Gnl,t , πnl,t(Dnl)\
{
t−1⋃
s=0
πnl,s(Dnl)
}
. (47)
Note that Tnl(QX) is a disjoint union Gnl,t, and for any R < R˜, consider the union of exclusive permutations sets
of small cardinality, namely
H(R) ,
⋃
t:|Gnl,t|≤2
nR
Gnl,t. (48)
A simple aspect of the asymptotic efficiency of the covering is that under the uniform distribution on the type class,
the probability that the source block belongs to a small exclusive permutations set is also small.
Lemma 5. For any R ≤ R˜
P
[
X ∈ H(R)|X ∈ Tn(QX)
] ·
≤ 2−n(R˜−R) (49)
Proof: Let an arbitrary δ > 0 be given. For all n sufficiently large, if Tn(QX) is empty then the statement of
the lemma is satisfied by convention. Otherwise,
P
[
X ∈ H(R)|X ∈ Tn(QX)
]
≤
κ∗n · e
nR
|Tn(QX)|
(50)
≤
2n[H(QX)−R˜+2δ] · enR
2n[H(QX)−δ]
(51)
= 2n(R−R˜+3δ). (52)
C. Proof of Achievability Part of Theorem 1
We follow the three steps outlined in Section V. In the first step of the proof, we focus on a single cryptogram,
Cn(y) =
{
ϕn(y,u) : u ∈ {0, 1}
nR
}
, which we generically denote by the set Cn = {w(0), . . . ,w(2nR− 1)} ⊂ Wn.
We begin with some definitions and simple properties. For a given (DL,DE) and QX ∈ Pn(X ), let X˜ be uniformly
19
distributed over D(Cn, QX ,DL) (defined in (25)). The exiguous-distortion probability for the set Cn is defined as8
pd(Cn, QX ,DL,DE) , max
z∈Zn
P
[
dE(X˜, z) ≤ DE
]
. (53)
We have the following simple properties for pd(Cn, QX ,DL,DE).
Proposition 6. Let Cn ⊂ Wn and QX ∈ Pn(X ) be given. Then:
1) For every permutation π
pd(Cn, QX ,DL,DE) = pd(π(Cn), QX ,DL,DE), (54)
where π(Cn) is as defined in (22).
2) Let X be uniformly distributed over Dn ⊆ D(Cn, QX ,DL). Then,
max
z∈Zn
P
[
dE(X, z) ≤ DE
]
≤
|D(Cn, QX ,DL)|
|Dn|
· pd(Cn, QX ,DL,DE). (55)
Proof:
1) Let z∗ be the maximizer of (53). Since dL(x,w) = dL(π(x), π(w)) then D(π(Cn), QX ,DL) = π (D(Cn, QX ,DL)).
Since also dE(x, z) = dE(π(x), π(z)) then
pd [π(Cn), QX ,DL,DE] = max
z∈Zn
P
[
dE(π(X˜), z) ≤ DE
]
(56)
≥ P
[
dE(π(X˜), π(z
∗)) ≤ DE
]
(57)
= pd(Cn, QX ,DL,DE), (58)
and the reverse inequality can be obtained similarly, by considering the inverse permutation π−1.
2) For every z ∈ Zn
P
[
dE(X, z) ≤ DE
]
=
|x ∈ Dn : dE(x, z) ≤ DE|
|Dn|
(59)
≤
|x ∈ D(Cn, QX ,DL) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE|
|Dn|
(60)
=
|D(Cn, QX ,DL)|
|Dn|
·
|x ∈ D(Cn, QX ,DL) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE|
|D(Cn, QX ,DL)|
(61)
≤
|D(Cn, QX ,DL)|
|Dn|
· pd(Cn, QX ,DL,DE). (62)
The next lemma is the first step in the proof, in which we prove the existence of a good set C∗n by a random
selection.
Lemma 7. Let δ > 0 and QX ∈ P(X ) be given, and let nl be the sequence of block-lengths such that Tnl(QX)
8With a slight abuse of notation, we also use here the notation pd(·).
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is non-empty. There exists a sequence of sets C∗ = {C∗nl} of size |C∗nl |= 2nlR such that for all l sufficiently large
1
nl
log|D(C∗nl , QX ,DL)|≥ H(QX) + R−RL(QX ,DL)− δ, (63)
and
−
1
nl
log max
z∈Znl
P
[
dE(X˜, z) ≤ DE
]
≥ min {R, RE(QX ,DE)} − δ, (64)
for all DE ≥ DL, where X˜ is distributed uniformly over D(C∗n, QX ,DL) .
Proof: Let n be given such that Tn(QX) is non-empty. Also, let DE be given, choose any QW ∈ Pn(W),
and consider an ensemble of randomly chosen sets Cn, where each member is selected independently at random,
uniformly within a type class Tn(QW ). By definition, for any given Cn
pd(Cn, QX ,DL,DE) =
maxz∈Zn |{x ∈ D(Cn, QX ,DL) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE}|
|D(Cn, QX ,DL)|
. (65)
It should be noticed, that unlike the situation in standard random coding bounds, here the denominator of (65)
is also a random variable. Nonetheless, we will show that there exists a set Cn such that both the numerator and
denominator of (65) are close to their expected values. To begin, let us analyze the expected value of the size of
the D-cover in the denominator of (65). We first consider the case R ≤ RL(QX ,DL). For a given Cn and QXW ,
define the type class enumerator
N(QXW |x) ,
∣∣∣{w ∈ Cn : Qˆxw = QXW}∣∣∣ , (66)
and let
E0 , H(QX) + R−RL(QX ,DL). (67)
Note that in the last equation the X-marginal (W -marginal) of Q is constrained to the given type QX (respectively,
QW ). For brevity, here and throughout the sequel, such constraints will be omitted. Then,
E[|D(Cn, QX ,DL)|] = E

 ∑
x∈Tn(QX)
I {∃w ∈ Cn : dL(x,w) ≤ DL}

 (68)
= E

 ∑
x∈Tn(QX)
I


⋃
QXW :EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL
{N(QXW |x) ≥ 1}



 (69)
.
= E

 ∑
x∈Tn(QX)
∑
QXW :EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL
I {N(QXW |x) ≥ 1}

 (70)
=
∑
x∈Tn(QX)
∑
QXW :EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL
P {N(QXW |x) ≥ 1} (71)
(a)
=
∑
x∈Tn(QX)
∑
QXW :EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL,IQ(X;W )>R
P {N(QXW |x) ≥ 1} (72)
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(b).
=
∑
x∈Tn(QX)
∑
QXW :EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL,IQ(X;W )>R
2n[R−IQ(X;W )] (73)
.
= 2nHQ(X) max
QXW∈Pn(X×W):EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL,IQ(X;W )>R
2n[R−IQ(X;W )] (74)
(c)
= exp
{
n ·
[
HQ(X) + R− min
QXW∈Pn(X×W):EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL
IQ(X;W )
]}
(75)
(d)
= 2nE0 , (76)
where in (a) and (c) we have used the assumption R ≤ RL(QX ,DL), and so, the set {QXW : EQ [dL(X,W )] ≤
DL, IQ(X;W ) ≤ R} is empty. In (b), we have used the fact that N(QXW |x) is a binomial random variable
pertaining to 2nR trials and probability of success of exponential order exp [−nIQ(X;W )]. Passage (d) follows
from the fact that P(X ×W) is dense in Q(X ×W) and IQ(X;W ) is continuous. In addition, using the union
bound, with probability 1,
|D(Cn, QX ,DL)| ≤
∑
w∈Cn
|{x ∈ Tn(QX) : dL(x,w) ≤ DL}| (77)
·
≤ 2nR · exp
[
n · max
QXW∈Pn(X×W):EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL
HQ(X|W )
]
(78)
= 2nE0 . (79)
Next, we upper bound the numerator of (65). For a given Cn and z ∈ Zn, define now the type class enumerator
N(QZW |z) ,
∣∣∣{w ∈ Cn : Qˆzw = QZW}∣∣∣ . (80)
Then,
|{x ∈ D(Cn, QX ,DL) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE}| (81)
=
∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
w∈Cn
{x ∈ Tn(QX) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE, dL(x,w) ≤ DL}
∣∣∣∣∣ (82)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
QZW
⋃
w∈Tn(QW |Z ,z)∩Cn
⋃
QX|ZW :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE,EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL
{
x ∈ Tn(QX|ZW , z,w)
}∣∣∣∣∣∣ (83)
(a)
≤
∑
QZW
∑
w∈Tn(QW |Z ,z)∩Cn
∑
QX|ZW :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE,EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL
∣∣{x ∈ Tn(QX|ZW , z,w)}∣∣ (84)
.
=
∑
QZW
∑
w∈Tn(QW |Z ,z)∩Cn
∑
QX|ZW :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE,EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL
2nHQ(X|ZW ) (85)
.
=
∑
QZW
∑
w∈Tn(QW |Z ,z)∩Cn
max
QX|ZW :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE,EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL
2nHQ(X|ZW ) (86)
=
∑
QZW
N(QZW |z) max
QX|ZW :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE,EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL
2nHQ(X|ZW ) (87)
.
= max
QZW
max
QX|ZW :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE,EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL
N(QZW |z)2
nHQ(X|ZW ) (88)
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.
=
∑
QXZW :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE,EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL
N(QZW |z)2
nHQ(X|ZW ) (89)
where (a) is the union bound, and in all the above equations, QXZW ∈ Pn(X × Z ×W). Let
J (DL,DE) , {QXZW ∈ Pn(X ×Z ×W) : EQ [dE(X,Z)] ≤ DE,EQ [dL(X,W )] ≤ DL} . (90)
Taking expectation, and using the fact that |Pn(X × Z × W)|≤ (n + 1)|X ||Z||W| i.e., increases with n only
polynomially,
E
[
max
z∈Zn
|{x ∈ D(Cn, QX ,DL) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE}|
]
(91)
·
≤ E

max
z∈Zn
∑
QXZW∈J (DL,DE)
N(QZW |z)2
nHQ(X|ZW )

 (92)
= E

 limβ→∞


∑
z∈Zn

 ∑
QXZW∈J (DL,DE)
N(QZW |z)2
nHQ(X|ZW )


β


1/β

 (93)
(a)
= lim
β→∞
E




∑
z∈Zn

 ∑
QXZW∈J (DL,DE)
N(QZW |z)2
nHQ(X|ZW )


β


1/β

 (94)
.
= lim
β→∞
E

{∑
z∈Zn
(
max
QXZW∈J (DL,DE)
N(QZW |z)2
nHQ(X|ZW )
)β}1/β (95)
= lim
β→∞
E

(∑
z∈Zn
max
QXZW∈J (DL,DE)
N(QZW |z)
β2nβHQ(X|ZW )
)1/β (96)
.
= lim
β→∞
E



∑
z∈Zn
∑
QXZW∈J (DL,DE)
N(QZW |z)
β2nβHQ(X|ZW )


1/β

 (97)
(b)
≤ lim
β→∞

∑
z∈Zn
∑
QXZW∈J (DL,DE)
E
[
N(QZW |z)
β
]
2nβHQ(X|ZW )


1/β
(98)
= lim
β→∞
(∑
z∈Zn
∑
QXZW∈J (DL,DE):IQ(Z;W )≤R
E
[
N(QZW |z)
β
]
2nβHQ(X|ZW )
+
∑
z∈Zn
∑
QXZW∈J (DL,DE):IQ(Z;W )>R
E
[
N(QZW |z)
β
]
2nβHQ(X|ZW )
)1/β
(99)
(c)
.
= lim
β→∞
(∑
z∈Zn
∑
QXZW∈J (DL,DE):QZ=Qˆz,IQ(Z;W )≤R
2nβ[R−IQ(Z;W )]2nβHQ(X|ZW )
+
∑
z∈Zn
∑
QXZW∈J (DL,DE):QZ=Qˆz,IQ(Z;W )>R
2n[R−IQ(Z;W )]2nβHQ(X|ZW )
)1/β
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.
= lim
β→∞
(∑
QZ
2nHQ(Z)
∑
QXW |Z :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE,EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL,IQ(Z;W )≤R
2nβ[R−IQ(Z;W )]2nβHQ(X|ZW )
+
∑
QZ
2nHQ(Z)
∑
QXW |Z :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE,EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL,IQ(Z;W )>R
2n[R−IQ(Z;W )]2nβHQ(X|ZW )
)1/β
(101)
.
= lim
β→∞
(
max
QXZW∈J (DL,DE):IQ(Z;W )≤R
2nHQ(Z)2nβ[R−IQ(Z;W )]2nβHQ(X|ZW )
+ max
QXZW∈J (DL,DE):IQ(Z;W )>R
2nHQ(Z)2n[R−IQ(Z;W )]2nβHQ(X|ZW )
)1/β
(102)
.
= lim
β→∞
(
max
{
max
QXZW∈J (DL,DE):IQ(Z;W )≤R
2nHQ(Z)2nβ[R−IQ(Z;W )]2nβHQ(X|ZW ),
max
QXZW∈J (DL,DE):IQ(Z;W )>R
2nHQ(Z)2n[R−IQ(Z;W )]2nβHQ(X|ZW )
})1/β
(103)
= lim
β→∞
max
{
max
QXZW∈J (DL,DE):IQ(Z;W )≤R
2n
1
β
HQ(Z)2n[R−IQ(Z;W )]2nHQ(X|ZW ),
max
QXZW∈J (DL,DE):IQ(Z;W )>R
2n
1
β
HQ(Z)2n
1
β
[R−IQ(Z;W )]2nHQ(X|ZW )
}
(104)
= max
{
max
QXZW∈J (DL,DE):IQ(Z;W )≤R
2n[R−IQ(Z;W )]2nHQ(X|ZW ),
max
QXZW∈J (DL,DE):IQ(Z;W )>R
2nHQ(X|ZW )
}
(105)
where (a) is by the Lebesgue monotone convergence theorem [30, Theorem 11.28] and the monotonicity of the
argument inside the expectation operator in β, and (b) is by the Jensen inequality. In (c), we have used the analysis
in [31, Subsection 6.3] of the moments of N(QZW |z), which is a binomial random variable with 2nR trials and
probability of success of the exponential order of exp [−nIQ(Z;W )]. Also, note that in all the above equations,
QXZW ∈ Pn(X × Z × W) but since P(X × Z × W) is dense in Q(X × Z × W) and the arguments of the
maximization are continuous functions of QXZW , we can change the maximization to be over Q(X × Z ×W).
Thus,
E
[
max
z∈Zn
|{x ∈ D(Cn, QX ,DL) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE}|
]
·
≤ 2nE1(DE) (106)
where
E1(DE) , max
QXZW :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE,EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL
{
HQ(X|ZW ) + [R− IQ(Z;W )]+
}
. (107)
Now, let δ > 0 be given. There exists n0(QX) such that for all n ≥ n0(QX), we have from (76)
E (|D(Cn, QX ,DL)|) ≥ 2
n(E0−
δ
2
), (108)
and from (79)
|D(Cn, QX ,DL)|≤ 2
n(E0+
δ
2
). (109)
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Define, for the given ensemble of the random sets
A0 ,
{
Cn : |D(Cn, QX ,DL)|> 2
−n δ
2E[|D(Cn, QX ,DL)|]
}
. (110)
The reverse Markov lemma (Lemma 2) implies
P (A0) ≥
1− 2−n
δ
2
2nδ − 2−n
δ
2
≥ 2−2nδ (111)
where the second inequality is satisfied for all n ≥ n′0 for some n′0 ≥ n0(QX).
Now, note that we need to prove that a single set C∗n satisfies (64) for all DE ≥ DL. To show this, we consider a
quantization of the possible values of DE. To this end, let an arbitrary η > 0 be given, such that J = RE(QX ,DL)η is
integer, and find DE sufficiently large such that9
RE(QX ,DE) ≤ lim
DE→∞
RE(QX ,DE) + η. (112)
Let us quantize the interval [RE(QX ,DE), RE(QX ,DL)] to values {R(0), . . . ,R(J)}, where R(j) = jη and let
DE(j) = R
−1
E (QX ,R(j)), where R−1E (QX ,R) is the inverse function of RE(QX ,DE). By (105), there exists
n1(j,QX ) such that for all n ≥ n1(j,QX)
E
[
max
z∈Zn
|{x ∈ D(Cn, QX ,DL) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE(j)}|
]
≤ 2n[E1(DE(j))+δ], (113)
where the expectation is over the random ensemble of sets Cn. By defining
A1j ,
{
Cn : max
z∈Zn
|{x ∈ D(Cn, QX ,DL) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE(j)}| ≤ 2
n[E1(DE(j))+4δ]
}
(114)
the ordinary Markov lemma implies
P (A1j) ≥ 1−
E [maxz∈Zn |{x ∈ D(Cn, QX ,DL) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE(j)}|]
2n[E1(DE(j))+4δ]
(115)
≥ 1− 2−3nδ. (116)
Defining A1 ,
⋂J
j=0A1j we get
P (A1) = P

 J⋂
j=0
A1j

 (117)
= 1− P

 J⋃
j=0
Ac1j

 (118)
≥ 1−
J∑
j=0
P
(
Ac1j
) (119)
≥ 1− J · 2−3nδ. (120)
9Note that if dE(x, z) <∞ for all x ∈ X , z ∈ Z, then limDE→∞RE(QX ,DE) = 0.
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Thus, since J does not depend on n, there exists n′1 ≥ max0≤j≤J n1(j,QX) such that for all n ≥ n′1
P (A0 ∩ A1) = 1− P (A
c
0 ∪ A
c
1) (121)
≥ 1− P (Ac0)− P (A
c
1) (122)
≥ 1− (1− 2−2nδ)− J2−n
5δ
2 (123)
= 2−2nδ − J · 2−3nδ (124)
> 0. (125)
Therefore, for all sufficiently large n > max{n′0, n′1}, there exists Cn ∈ A0 ∩ {
⋂J
j=0A1j}, i.e., Cn which satisfies
both
|D(Cn, QX ,DL)|> 2
−n δ
2E[|D(Cn, QX ,DL)|] (126)
and
max
z∈Zn
|{x ∈ D(Cn, QX ,DL) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE(j)}| ≤ 2
4nδ2nE1(DE(j)) (127)
for all 0 ≤ j ≤ J . Thus we get
pd [Cn, QX ,DL,DE(j)] ≤
24nδ2nE1(DE(j))
2−n
δ
2 2n(E0−n
δ
2
)
= 25nδ · 2n[E1(DE(j))−E0]. (128)
If we now define E(DE) , E1(DE)− E0, then for any given QW ∈ Pn(W)
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log pd [Cn, QX ,DL,DE(j)] ≥ E(DE). (129)
Now, choose let QW be the W -marginal of QXW which achieves RL(QX ,DL). Then,
E(DE) ≥ min
QXZW :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE,EQ[dL(X,W )]EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL,IQ(Z;W )≤R
{IQ(Z;W ) + IQ(X;Z,W )}
− min
QXW :EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL
IQ(X;W ) (130)
(a)
≥ min
QXZW :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE,EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL,IQ(Z;W )≤R
{IQ(Z;W ) + IQ(X;Z,W ) − IQ(X;W )} (131)
= min
QXZW :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE,EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL,IQ(Z;W )≤R
{IQ(Z;W ) + IQ(X;Z|W )} (132)
= min
QXZW :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE,EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL,IQ(Z;W )≤R
IQ(X,W ;Z) (133)
(b)
≥ min
QXZW :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE
IQ(X;Z) (134)
= RE(QX ,DE) (135)
where (a) is by restricting QXW to be the same in both minimizations of (130), and (b) is by the data processing
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property of the mutual information. Similarly,
E(DE) ≥ R+ min
QXZW :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE,EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL,IQ(Z;W )>R
IQ(X;Z,W )
− min
QXW :EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL
IQ(X;W ) (136)
≥ R+ min
QXZW :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE,EQ[dL(X,W )]≤DL,IQ(Z;W )>R
IQ(X;Z|W ) (137)
≥ R. (138)
by restricting QXW to be the same in both minimizations of (136).
Therefore, (129), (135) and (136) imply that
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log pd [Cn, QX ,DL,DE(j)] ≥ min {RE(QX ,DE(j)),R} (139)
for all 0 ≤ j ≤ J . By taking η ↓ 0, continuity of RE(QX ,DE) in DE provides the lower bound (64) for all DE ≥ DL.
Then, (63) is obtained from (126) and (108).
To complete the proof of the lemma, we consider the case of R ≥ RL(QX ,DL). Denote by Q(n)XW a sequence of
distributions such that Q(n)XW → Q∗XW as n →∞, where Q∗XW achieves the rate-distortion function RL(QX ,DL).
For a given Cn, let C˜n be a subset formed by the first enRL(QX ,DL) members of Cn. The same analysis as before
shows that when randomly drawing a set Cn uniformly over the W -marginal of Q(n)XW , there exists a sequence of
sets {Cn} such that
|D(C˜n, QX ,DL)|≥ 2
n(E0−δ) ≥ 2n[H(QX)−δ]. (140)
Then, for Cn
pd(Cn, QX ,DL,DE) =
maxz∈Zn |{x ∈ D(Cn, QX ,DL) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE}|
|D(Cn, QX ,DL)|
(141)
≤
maxz∈Zn |{x ∈ D(Cn, QX ,DL) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE}|
|D(C˜n, QX ,DL)|
(142)
≤
maxz∈Zn |{x ∈ Tn(QX) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE}|
|D(C˜n, QX ,DL)|
(143)
≤
maxz∈Zn |{x ∈ Tn(QX) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE}|
2n[H(QX)−δ]
(144)
= 2−n[H(QX)−δ] max
z∈Zn
∑
QX|Z :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE
∣∣Tn(QX|Z , z)∣∣ (145)
≤ 2−n[H(QX)−δ] max
QZ
∑
QX|Z :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE
2nHQ(X|Z) (146)
.
= exp
(
−n
[
HQ(X)− δ − max
QXZ :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE
HQ(X|Z)
])
(147)
≤ 2−n[RE(QX ,DE)−δ] (148)
and the proof of the lemma is complete, as δ is arbitrary.
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Remark 8. As mentioned in Section V, to show achievability of an exiguous-distortion exponent using the method
of types, uniform convergence of − 1n log pd(C∗n, QX ,DL,DE) to the exponent min {R, RE(QX ,DE)} is required (cf.
eq. (233)). However, the proof of Lemma 7 is not sufficient to show this. Specifically, the convergence in the
asymptotic analysis of the type class enumerators, i.e. the relations
P {N(QXW |x) ≥ 1}
.
= 2n[R−IQ(X;W )] (149)
used in (73) and
E
[
N(QZW |z)
β
]
.
=


2n[R−IQ(Z;W )], IQ(Z;W ) ≤ R
2nβ[R−IQ(Z;W )], IQ(Z;W ) > R
(150)
used in (100), are not uniform in QX .
We continue with the second step of the proof, which constructs from the set C∗n a secure rate-distortion code
for all x ∈ Tn(QX). The proof of the next lemma is based on the permutations technique described in Subsection
VI-B.
Lemma 9. For any given QX ∈ P(X ) ∩ intQ(X ) and δ > 0, there exists a sequence of secure rate-distortion
codes S∗ of fixed key rate R such that
lim
n→∞
1
n
log|Yn|≤ RL(QX ,DL) + δ, (151)
and,
P [dL(X, ϕ
∗
n(f
∗
n(X,u))) ≥ DL|X ∈ Tn(QX)] = 0 (152)
for every u ∈ {0, 1}nR, as well as
E−d (S
∗,DE, QX) ≥ min {R, RE(QX ,DE)} − δ (153)
for all DE ≥ DL.
Proof: Assume that QX ∈ [intQ(X )]∩Pn0(X ) for some minimal n0 ∈ N. Since the statements in the lemma
are only about conditional events given the type QX , it is clear that the secure rate-distortion codes constructed
S∗n, may only encode x ∈ Tn(QX), and so only block-lengths n mod n0 = 0 should be considered, as otherwise
Tn(QX) is empty.
Let C∗ = {C∗n} be a sequence of sets of size 2nR constructed according to Lemma 7. So for all n sufficiently
large
pd(C
∗
n, QX ,DL,DE) ≤ 2
−n[min{R,RE(QX ,DE)}−δ], (154)
and
|D(C∗n, QX ,DL)| ≥ 2
n(A−δ), (155)
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where
A , min {H(QX) + R−RL(QX ,DL),H(QX)} . (156)
Now, let {πn,t}κnt=0 be a set of permutations constructed according to Lemma 4, such that
κn⋃
t=0
πn,t(D(C
∗
n, QX ,DL)) = Tn(QX), (157)
where κn ≤ 2n[H(QX)−A+2δ)], and let {Gn,t} be the resulting exclusive permutation sets, as defined in (47).
We construct the following secure rate-distortion codes S∗n = (f∗n, ϕ∗n) of fixed key rate R, which only encode
x ∈ Tn(QX). We utilize the covering of the type class Tn(QX) by permutations of a D-cover of the set C∗n
to encode the source block in the following way. Assume that the elements of C∗n are arbitrarily ordered, i.e.
C∗n = {w(0), . . . ,w(2
nR − 1)}. For a given x ∈ Tn(QX), let
t∗(x) , min {t : x ∈ Gn,t} , (158)
and
i∗(x) , min{i : w(i) ∈ Gn,t∗(x), dL(x,w(i)) ≤ DL} (159)
The encoding is a concatenation of the following two parts y = f∗n(x,u) = (ty, iy):
• A description of the permutation set, defined as ty , B[t∗(x);n(H(QX )−A+ 2δ)].
• An encrypted description of the distortion covering codeword, defined as iy , B[i∗(x);nR]⊕ u.
It is easily verified that given u, the legitimate decoder can reproduce w = ϕn(y,u) such that dL(x,w) ≤ DL, for
all x ∈ Tn(QX), and so (152) is satisfied. Regarding the coding rate, note that
1
n
log|Yn| = H(QX)−A+ 2δ + R (160)
≤ RL(QX ,DL) + 3δ (161)
for all n sufficiently large, which results in (151).
It remains to prove that for any eavesdropper σn, the conditional exiguous-distortion exponent, given that X ∈
Tn(QX), is larger than min {R, RE(QX ,DE)} − δ. From Proposition 3, it may be assumed that the eavesdropper is
aware of the type QX . Moreover, given the cryptogram Y = y, the source block X is distributed uniformly over
Gn,ty , and independent of iy. Thus, the optimal eavesdropper has the same estimate for cryptograms with the same
ty, and we may denote its estimate as z = σn(y) , z(ty). Since Gn,0 = D(C∗n, QX ,DL), then conditioned on the
event {t∗(X) = 0}, for any z ∈ Zn, Lemma 7 implies
P [dE(X, z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX), t
∗(X) = 0] = P [dE(X, z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Gn,0] (162)
≤ 2−n[min{R,RE(QX ,DE)}−δ] (163)
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for all n sufficiently large. It then follows that for 0 < t ≤ κn,
P [dE(X, z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX), t
∗(X) = t] = P [dE(X, z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Gn,t]
(a)
≤
|Gn,0|
|Gn,t|
P [dE(X, z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Gn,0]
≤
|Gn,0|
|Gn,t|
2−n(min{R,RE(QX ,DE)}−δ), (164)
where (a) follows from the fact that for any 0 < t ≤ κn, there exists a permutation π such that π (Gn,t) ⊂ Gn,0 =
D(C∗n, QX ,DL) and Proposition 6. Thus, the exiguous-distortion probability conditioned on t∗(X) = t can be larger
than the same probability conditioned on t∗(X) = 0, but only up to a factor of |Gn,0||Gn,t| , which is large if |Gn,t|
is small. Next, we show that the contribution to the exiguous-distortion probability of these small sets does not
impact its exponential behavior. To this end, for any fixed 0 < η < A + δ such that J = A+δη is an integer, let
us quantize the interval [0, A+ δ] to values {A0, . . . , AJ}, where Aj = jη. We will treat separately sets such that
2nAj ≤ |Gn,t|≤ 2
nAj+1
. For all n sufficiently large
P [dE(X, z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)] (165)
=
κn∑
t=0
P [X ∈ Gn,t|X ∈ Tn(QX)]P [dE(X, z(t)) ≤ DE|X ∈ Gn,t,X ∈ Tn(QX)] (166)
=
J−1∑
j=0
∑
t:2nAj≤|Gn,t|≤2
nAj+1
P [X ∈ Gn,t|X ∈ Tn(QX)]P [dE(X, z(t)) ≤ DE|X ∈ Gn,t,X ∈ Tn(QX)] (167)
(a)
≤
J−1∑
j=0
∑
t:2nAj≤|Gn,t|≤2
nAj+1
P [X ∈ Gn,t|X ∈ Tn(QX)]
|Gn,0|
|Gn,t|
2−n(min{R,RE(QX ,DE)}−δ) (168)
≤
J−1∑
j=0
∑
t:2nAj≤|Gn,t|≤2
nAj+1
P [X ∈ Gn,t|X ∈ Tn(QX)]
2n(A+δ)
2nAj
2−n(min{R,RE(QX ,DE)}−δ) (169)
=
J−1∑
j=0
2n(A+δ)
2nAj
2−n(min{R,RE(QX ,DE)}−δ)
∑
t:2nAj≤|Gn,t|≤2
nAj+1
P [X ∈ Gn,t|X ∈ Tn(QX)] (170)
(b)
≤
J−1∑
j=0
2n(A+δ)
2nAj
2−n(min{R,RE(QX ,DE)}−δ)P [X ∈ H(Aj+1)|X ∈ Tn(QX)] (171)
(c)
≤
J−1∑
j=0
2n(A+δ)
2nAj
2−n(min{R,RE(QX ,DE)}−δ)2−n(A−Aj+1−δ) (172)
≤ J · max
0≤j≤J−1
2n(Aj+1+2δ)
2nAj
2−n(min{R,RE(QX ,DE)}−δ) (173)
≤ 2n(η+3δ)2−n·min{R,RE(QX ,DE)} (174)
(d)
≤ 2n(η+4δ)2−n·min{R,RE(QX ,DE)} (175)
where (a) is using (164), (b) is using the definition in (48), (c) is using Lemma 5, and (d) is since J .= 1. The
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result follows by taking η ↓ 0.
Remark 10. Note that only the properties (154)-(155) of D(C∗n, QX ,DL) were used in order to prove Lemma 9.
The same proof of Lemma 9 can be used to show that if some other set Dn ⊂ D(C∗n, QX ,DL) satisfies similar
properties, i.e. if for some E > 0
max
z∈Zn
P
[
dE(X˜, z) ≤ DE
]
≤ 2−nE , (176)
where here X˜ is distributed uniformly over Dn, and
|Dn| ≥ 2
n(A−δ) (177)
then a secure rate-distortion code can be constructed, with conditional exiguous-distortion exponent E. In this case,
the code is constructed such that only source blocks in Dn are mapped to the permutation index t∗(x) = 0, but not
source blocks from D(C∗n, QX ,DL)\Dn. In addition, if the coding rate is unconstrained, then the condition (177)
is not required. This fact will be utilized in the sequel in the proof of Lemma 13.
In the third step of the achievability proof, we construct the secure rate-distortion code for all types in P(X ).
We will need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 11. Let QX , Q′X ∈ Pn(X ) and assume that10 ||QX −Q′X ||= 2d
∗
n where d
∗ > 0. If x ∈ Tn(QX) then
min
x′∈Tn(Q′X)
dH(x,x
′) ≤ d∗. (178)
Proof: See the extended version of [27, Lemma 20].
Lemma 12. Let QX ∈ Pn(X ) and x ∈ Tn(QX). For any given 1 ≤ k < n let x′ = xn−k1 . Then
||Qˆx − Qˆx′ ||< |X |·
k
n− k
. (179)
Proof: See the extended version of [27, Lemma 21].
We are now ready for the third and final step of the proof of the achievability part of Theorem 1.
Proof of achievability part of Theorem 1: Let 0 < ǫ < 1 be given, and find n0 sufficiently large such that for
any Q′X ∈ P(X ) there exists QX ∈ Pn0(X )∩intQ(X ) such that ||QX−Q′X ||≤ ǫ2 . We will term Pn0(X )∩intQ(X )
as the grid. Also let n1 = n0ǫ+2n0|X |. We construct the following sequence of secure rate-distortion codes S for
all n > max{n0, n1}. We will use the following definitions and constructions:
• Let n˜ =
⌊
n
n0
⌋
· n0.
• Enumerate the types of the source Pn(X ).
• Assume, w.l.o.g., that X = {1, . . . , |X |} and let X , {0} ∪ X .
10For two different types in Pn(X ), the minimal variation distance is 2n .
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• Let
BnH(ǫ) ,
{
x ∈ X
n
: dH(x,0) ≤
nǫ
2
}
, (180)
i.e., an Hamming ball of radius nǫ2 and dimension n.
• Construct the codes S∗n˜,QX = (f
∗
n˜,QX
, ϕ∗n˜,QX ) of key rate R as in Lemma 9, for all QX ∈ Pn0(X )∩ intQ(X ).
• For every given QX ∈ Pn(X ) find
Φǫ(QX) , argmin
Q′X∈Pn0 (X )∩intQ(X )
||QX −Q
′
X ||. (181)
• For any given x ∈ X n and x ∈ X n, define the replacement operator Ψ : X n × X n → X n which for
x˜ = Ψ(x,x) satisfies
x˜i =


xi, xi = 0
xi, xi 6= 0
(182)
• For a given x ∈ X n, define the replacement set
K(x, ǫ) ,
{
x ∈ Bn˜H(ǫ) : Ψ(x
n˜
1 ,x) ∈ Tn˜(Φǫ(Qˆx))
}
. (183)
Note that the size of K(x, ǫ) depends on x only via its type Qˆx.
The above type enumeration and the codes constructed are revealed to both the encoder and the decoder off-line.
Before we provide the details of the encoding and the legitimate decoding, we outline the main ideas. Using the
construction of Lemma 9, we construct secure rate distortion codes for each type in the grid Pn0(X ) ∩ intQ(X ).
Since this grid has a finite number of types, then for all sufficiently large n, the normalized logarithm of the
conditional exiguous-distortion probability is close to the exponent (153) uniformly over all types in the grid. As
mentioned in the outline of the proof in Section IV, we will modify any given source block so that it can be
encoded using one of the codes in the grid. In order to allow the legitimate decoder to be able to reproduce with
the desired distortion DL, the cryptogram will be comprised of (at most) four parts, each one of them being encrypted
using key bits u(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. First, the type of the source Qˆx is conveyed to the legitimate decoder, and, in
accordance with Proposition 3, the type information is not encrypted, and so u(1) is the empty string. This type
will be modified to the type Φǫ(Qˆx), which is also known to the legitimate decoder and the eavesdropper. Second,
since if n mod n0 6= 0 then Qˆx may not belong to the grid, we first truncate the source block to the length n˜. The
truncated part xnn˜+1 will be sent to the legitimate decoder losslessly, and fully encrypted using u(2). Third, we will
modify xn˜1 to the modified vector v, such that Qˆv = Φǫ(Qˆx). This will be done by replacing a small number of the
symbols of x. The symbols of x which were replaced in order to create v will be sent to the legitimate decoder
losslessly, and fully encrypted using u(3). Note, that there might be more than one way to replace the symbols of
x, and in fact, any x ∈ K(x, ǫ) can be used for this purpose if we define v , Ψ(xn˜1 ,x) using (182) and (183).
For the sake of the analysis, it will be convenient to choose a replacement vector randomly from K(x, ǫ). This
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will be achieved using key bits u, which in this case, function as common randomness rather than for encryption.
Fourth, the code s∗
n˜,Φǫ(Qˆx)
will be used to encode the modified vector v using the key bits u(4). As we will prove,
the whole modification procedure incurs a negligible cost on the compression and secrecy performance, which we
analyze after formally defining the encoder and legitimate decoder.
Encoding: Let u = (u(1),u(2),u(3),u(4),u). The following cryptogram parts are generated:
• Source block type: Find the type index 0 ≤ j∗ ≤ |Pn(X )|−1 of the source block type in the enumeration of
the types, and let
y1 , B[j
∗; log|Pn(X )|]. (184)
Set u(1) = φ, namely, the type information is not encrypted, in accordance with Proposition 3.
• Fully encrypted source block tail:
y2 , B[x
n
n˜+1; (n − n˜) log|X |]⊕ u
(2) (185)
• Modification vector: Let x be the Ku-th vector in K(x, ǫ), where u is of length log|K(x, ǫ)| bits, and Ku is
integer corresponding to u, i.e.
Ku ,
log|K(x,ǫ)|∑
l=1
ul · 2
(l−1) + 1. (186)
Also, let
v , Ψ(xn˜1 ,x) (187)
and let x′′′ ∈ X n where
x′′′i =


0, xi = 0
xi, xi 6= 0
. (188)
As clearly x′′′ ∈ Bn˜H(ǫ), let i∗ be the index of x′′′ in Bn˜H(ǫ) and
y3 , B[i
∗; log|Bn˜H(ǫ)|]⊕ u
(3). (189)
• Cryptogram of modified vector: Let
y4 , s
∗
n˜,Φǫ(Qˆx)
(v,u(4)) (190)
where u(4) is of length nR bits.
The encoding of the source block is separated into two cases, depending on its type Qˆx. If RL < RL(Qˆx,DL) then
y = f∗n(x,u) = y1. (191)
Otherwise, if RL ≥ RL(Qˆx,DL) then
y = f∗n(x,u) = (y1, y2, y3, y4). (192)
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To verify that such coding is possible, notice that from Lemma 12 and the fact that n > n1, we have
||Qˆxn˜1 − Qˆx||≤
ǫ
2
(193)
and by the triangle inequality
||Qˆxn˜1 − Qˆv||≤ ||Qˆxn˜1 − Qˆx||+||Qˆx − Qˆv||≤
ǫ
2
+
ǫ
2
= ǫ. (194)
Thus, the definition (180), and Lemma 11 imply that K(x, ǫ) is indeed non-empty, and an appropriate x can always
be found.
Decoding by the legitimate decoder: Upon observing y = f∗n(x,u):
• Recover the type Qˆx from y1, and determine Φǫ(Qˆx) and |K(x, ǫ)|.
• If RL < RL(Qˆx,DL) then arbitrarily choose a vector from w˜ ∈ Wn, and reproduce
w , ϕ∗n(y,u) = w˜. (195)
Otherwise, if RL ≥ RL(Qˆx,DL) then:
– Recover xnn˜+1 from y2 and u(2). Let w′′ ∈ Wn−n˜ be such that dL(xnn˜+1,w′′) = 0.
– Recover x′′′ from y3 and u(3), and let w′′′ ∈ W n˜ be such that dL(x′′′,w′′′) = 0.
– Reproduce v from y4 and u(4) as
w
′′′′ , ϕ∗
n˜,Qˆx
(y4,u
(4)) (196)
– Reproduce the source block as
w , ϕ∗n(y,u) = (Ψ(w
′′′′,w′′′),w′′). (197)
Note that the decoder knows |K(x, ǫ)| and thus can compute the total length of u. So, if multiple source blocks
are encoded in succession, the legitimate decoder can stay synchronized with the encoder and use the correct key
bits when deciphering the message.
For the sequence of codes S∗ constructed, we need to verify that the compression constraint is satisfied, and to
find the achievable exiguous-distortion exponent for any (type aware) eavesdropper, as well as the key rate. First,
consider the compression constraint. For the rate, recall that the cryptogram is composed of at most four parts
(192). Let Ynj be the alphabet of the j-th part, for 1 ≤ j ≤ 4, such that |Yn|=
∏4
j=1|Ynj|. We have,
|Yn1|= |Pn(X )|≤ (n+ 1)
|X |, (198)
and
|Yn2|= |X |
n−n˜. (199)
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For Yn3,
|Yn3|=
∣∣Bn˜H(ǫ)∣∣ =
n˜ǫ
2∑
k=0
(
n˜
k
)
|X |k (200)
≤
n˜ǫ
2
·
(
n˜⌈
n˜ǫ
2
⌉)|X | n˜ǫ2 (201)
≤ 2n˜[hB(
ǫ
2
)+ ǫ
2
log|X |] (202)
, 2n˜g(ǫ) (203)
where g(ǫ) was implicitly defined, and g(ǫ) ↓ 0 as ǫ ↓ 0. For Yn4, notice that the cryptogram part y4 is only used
for types QX which satisfy RL ≥ RL(QX ,DL). Thus,
|Yn4| ≤
∑
QX∈Pn(QX):RL≥RL(QX ,DL)
2nRL(QX ,DL) (204)
≤ |Pn(X )|·2
nRL (205)
Therefore, for all n sufficiently large
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log|Yn| ≤ lim sup
n→∞
4∑
j=1
1
n
log|Ynj | (206)
≤ RL + g(ǫ) + 3δ. (207)
Now, as the codes S∗n˜,QX are constructed according to Lemma 9, it is easily verified that if RL ≥ RL(Qˆx,DL) then
for any u
dL(x, ϕ
∗
n(f
∗
n(x,u),u)) ≤ DL (208)
(see (152)). Thus, as |Pn(X )|≤ (n+ 1)|X |, for all n sufficiently large
P [dL(X, ϕ
∗
n(f
∗
n(X,u),u)) ≥ DL] (209)
=
∑
QX∈Pn(X )
P [X ∈ Tn(QX)]P [dL(X, ϕ
∗
n(f
∗
n(X,u),u)) ≥ DL|X ∈ Tn(QX)] (210)
≤
∑
QX∈Pn(X ):RL<RL(QX ,DL)
P [X ∈ Tn(QX)] (211)
≤
∑
QX∈Pn(X ):RL<RL(QX ,DL)
2−nD(QX ||PX) (212)
≤ 2−n[EL(PX ,DL,RL)−δ] (213)
≤ 2−n(EL−δ). (214)
Second, let us analyze the exiguous-distortion exponent of S for an arbitrary eavesdropper. Let vˆ∗ be the eaves-
dropper which maximizes the exiguous-distortion probability for the modified source block v, given the cryptogram
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y. Then,
E−d (S,DE)
(a)
= lim inf
n→∞
min
QX∈Pn(X )
{
D (QX ||PX )−
1
n
log max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)]
}
(215)
(b)
≥ lim inf
n→∞
min
{
min
QX∈Pn(X ):RL≥RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (QX ||PX)−
1
n
log
(
|Bn˜H(ǫ)|P
[
dE(V, Vˆ
∗) ≤ DE|V ∈ Tn˜(Φǫ(QX))
])}
,
min
QX∈Pn(X ):RL<RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (QX ||PX)−
1
n
log max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)]
}}
(216)
(c)
≥ lim inf
n→∞
min
{
min
QX∈Pn(X ):RL≥RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (QX ||PX)−
1
n
log
[
|Bn˜H(ǫ)|P
[
dE(V, Vˆ
∗) ≤ DE|V ∈ Tn˜(Φǫ(QX))
]]}
,
min
QX∈Pn(X ):RL<RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (QX ||PX) +RE(QX ,DE)− δ
}}
(217)
= min
{
lim inf
n→∞
min
QX∈Pn(X ):RL≥RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (QX ||PX)−
1
n
log
[
|Bn˜H(ǫ)|P
[
dE(V, Vˆ
∗) ≤ DE|V ∈ Tn˜(Φǫ(QX))
]]}
,
lim inf
n→∞
min
QX∈Pn(X ):RL<RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (QX ||PX) +RE(QX ,DE)− δ
}}
, (218)
where the passages are explained as follows:
• Equality (a) is standard method of types, (as, e.g., in (214)). Notice that the exiguous-distortion event
{dE(X,Z) ≤ DE} in this equation is for the code Sn.
• Equality (b) is verified by establishing the following properties:
– Property 1: Due to the permutation invariance of type classes and Hamming spheres, given the event
X ∈ Tn(QX), V is distributed uniformly over Tn˜(Φǫ(QX)). Indeed, let v′,v′′ ∈ Tn˜(Φǫ(QX)), where
v
′ = π(v′′) for some permutation π. Then, if for some x ∈ Tn(QX) and x ∈ K(x, ǫ)
v
′ = Ψ(xn˜1 ,x) (219)
then
v
′′ = Ψ(π(xn˜1 ), π(x)) (220)
where (π(xn˜1 ),xnn˜+1) ∈ Tn(QX) and π(x) ∈ K((π(xn˜1 ),xnn˜+1), ǫ)11. The property then follows from the
fact that |K(x, ǫ))| depends on x only via its type, which is identical for both x and (π(xn˜1 ),xnn˜+1).
11Notice that K(x) depends on x only via its first n˜ components.
36
– Property 2: An eavesdropper for v is aware of its type (as Qˆv = Φǫ(Qˆx))12, and the cryptogram y2 is
not relevant for its estimate. Also, since y3 is fully encrypted (pure random bits) then it is also useless.
Thus, an eavesdropper for v uses only the type information in y1 and y4.
– Property 3: Consider the case RL ≥ RL(QX ,DL). The source block X is distributed uniformly over
Tn(QX) and V is distributed uniformly over Tn˜(Φǫ(QX)). Let Vˆ∗ be the eavesdropper which achieves
the maximal exiguous-distortion probability for V, given y4. Then, for any eavesdropper decoder σ˜n which
estimates z
1
|Bn˜H(ǫ)|
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)] ≤ P
[
dE(V, Vˆ
∗) ≤ DE|V ∈ Tn˜(Φǫ(QX))
]
. (221)
Indeed, since Xnn˜+1 is fully encrypted then it is easy to verify that
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)] ≤ P
[
dE(X
n˜
1 ,Z
n˜
1 ) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)
]
. (222)
Now, any eavesdropper Zn˜1 for Xn˜1 can be transformed into an eavesdropper Vˆ for V, by a uniformly
distributed guess of X over Bn˜H(b) (see (187)) and then setting
vˆ =


argminz∈Z dE(xi, z), xi 6= 0
zi, xi = 0
(223)
where by assumption, minz∈Z dE(xi, z) = 0. If the guess of x is correct (according to the relation (187))
then
dE(v, vˆ) ≤ dE(x, z). (224)
Since this happens with probability larger than
[
|Bn˜H(ǫ)|
]−1
, then (222) implies (221).
Equality (b) then follows from the above considerations.
• Inequality (c) is because in case RL < RL(QX ,DL) the eavesdropper has no knowledge beyond the type of
the source block, and so given such y, x is distributed uniformly over Tn(QX). For any given z ∈ Zn, using
standard method of types
P [dE(X, z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)] =
∑
x∈Tn(QX):dE(x,z)≤DE
1
|Tn(QX)|
(225)
=
∑
QX|Z :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE
∑
x∈Tn(QX|Z ,z)
1
|Tn(QX)|
(226)
=
1
|Tn(QX)|
∑
QX|Z :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE
∣∣Tn(QX|Z , z)∣∣ (227)
.
= exp
{
−n · min
QX|Z :EQ[dE(X,Z)]≤DE
[−HQ(X|Z) +H(QX)]
}
(228)
12Which is in fact not even required, using Proposition 3.
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Then,
max
z
P [dE(X, z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)] ≤ 2
−n[RE(QX ,DE)−δ]. (229)
Next, we further bound the first term in the minimization of (218) as follows
lim inf
n→∞
min
QX∈Pn(X ):RL≥RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (QX ||PX)−
1
n
log
[
|Bn˜H(ǫ)|P
[
dE(V, Vˆ
∗) ≤ DE|V ∈ Tn˜(Φǫ(QX))
]]}
(230)
(a)
≥ lim inf
n→∞
min
QX∈Pn(X ):RL≥RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (QX ||PX)−
1
n
log P
[
dE(V, Vˆ
∗) ≤ DE|V ∈ Tn˜(Φǫ(QX))
]
− g(ǫ)
}
(231)
(b)
= lim inf
n→∞
min
QX∈Pn(X ):RL≥RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (QX ||PX )−
1
n˜
log P
[
dE(V, Vˆ
∗) ≤ DE|V ∈ Tn˜(Φǫ(QX))
]
− g(ǫ)
}
(232)
(c)
≥ lim inf
n→∞
min
QX∈Pn(X ):RL≥RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (QX ||PX) + min {R, RE(QX ,DE)} − δ − g(ǫ)
}
(233)
(d)
≥ lim inf
n→∞
min
QX∈Pn(X ):RL≥RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (Φǫ(QX)||PX ) + min {R, RE(QX ,DE)} − δ − δ1(ǫ)− g(ǫ)
}
(234)
(e)
= lim inf
n→∞
min
QX∈Pn0 (X ):RL≥RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (Φǫ(QX)||PX ) + min {R, RE(QX ,DE)} − δ − δ1(ǫ)− g(ǫ)
}
(235)
(f)
= lim inf
n→∞
min
QX∈Pn0(X ):RL≥RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (QX ||PX) + min {R, RE(QX ,DE)} − δ − δ1(ǫ)− g(ǫ)
}
(236)
= min
QX∈Pn0 (X ):RL≥RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (QX ||PX) + min {R, RE(QX ,DE)} − δ − δ1(ǫ)− g(ǫ)
}
, (237)
≥ lim inf
n→∞
min
QX∈Pn(X ):RL≥RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (QX ||PX) + min {R, RE(QX ,DE)} − δ − δ1(ǫ)− g(ǫ)
}
(238)
• Inequality (a) follows from the fact that since 0 < ǫ < 1, for all n sufficiently large
∣∣Bn˜H(ǫ)∣∣ ≤ 2n˜g(ǫ) as in
(203).
• Equality (b) is because n˜n → 1 as n→∞.
• Inequality (c) is because there exists n2 sufficiently large, such that for all n > n2 the error probability of the
any eavesdropper decoder σ∗n˜,Φǫ(QX) satisfies
−
1
n˜
log P
[
Vˆ 6= V|V ∈ Tn˜(Φǫ(QX))
]
≥ min {R, RE(QX ,DE)} − δ (239)
uniformly for all QX ∈ Pn0(QX).
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• Inequality (d) is by defining
δ1(ǫ) , max
QX
|D (Φǫ(QX)||PX)−D(QX ||PX)| . (240)
Note that since D(QX ||PX) is a continuous function of QX in Q(X ) (as the support of PX is assumed to be
X ), it is also uniformly continuous. So, δ1(ǫ) ↓ 0 as ǫ ↓ 0.
• Equalities (e) and (f) are because Φǫ(QX) ∈ Pn0(X ) for all QX ∈ Pn(X ).
Substituting (238) into (218), and using the fact Pn(X ) ⊂ Q(X ) we obtain
E−d (S,DE) ≥ min
{
min
QX∈Q(X ):RL≥RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (QX ||PX) + min {R, RE(QX ,DE)} − g(ǫ) − δ1(ǫ),
min
QX∈Q(X ):RL<RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (QX ||PX ) +RE(QX ,DE)
}}
− δ (241)
≥ min
{
min
QX∈Q(X ):RL≥RL(QX ,DL)
{
D (QX ||PX) + R,
min
QX∈P(X )
{
D (QX ||PX) +RE(QX ,DE)
}}
− δ − δ1(ǫ)− g(ǫ) (242)
(a)
≥ min {R, E∗e (DE)} − δ − δ1(ǫ)− g(ǫ) (243)
where in (a) we have used the definition in (16), and the fact that the assumption EL > 0 implies that RL ≥
RL(PX ,DL).
Next, we analyze the required key rate. If RL < RL(Qˆx,DL) then the required key rate is zero. Otherwise, if
RL ≥ RL(Qˆx,DL) then the total key rate required to encode x ∈ QX is given by
1
n
[
(n− n˜) log|X |+ log |K(x, ǫ)| + log
∣∣Bn˜H(ǫ)∣∣+ nR] . (244)
Now, for all n sufficiently large
1
n
(n− n˜) log|X |≤
n0 log|X |+1
n
≤ δ, (245)
1
n
log |K(x, ǫ)| ≤
1
n
log
∣∣Bn˜H(ǫ)∣∣ ≤ g(ǫ), (246)
Thus, the required key rate is less than
R+ 2g(ǫ) + 2δ. (247)
By taking ǫ ↓ 0 we obtain g(ǫ) ↓ 0 and δ1(ǫ) ↓ 0, and so we obtain the achievability part of Theorem 1.
D. Proof of Converse Part of Theorem 1
Following the outline of the converse, we begin with a lemma which constructs from a given sequence of codes
S a new sequence S∗, with constant key rate, which is less than R(S, QX) + δ, and a zero excess-distortion
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probability at the legitimate receiver.
Lemma 13. Let S be an arbitrary sequence of secure rate-distortion codes, which satisfies a compression constraint
(RL,DL,EL). Also, let QX ∈ P(X ) be given such that D(QX ||PX) < EL. Then, for every δ > 0, there exists a
sequence of secure rate-distortion codes S∗ such that:
1) For all n and all x ∈ Tn(QX), S∗n has fixed key rate r∗(x) = R∗ where R∗ ≤ R(S, QX) + δ.
2) For all n and {ui}∞i=1, S∗n = (f∗n, ϕ∗n) satisfies
P [dL(X, ϕ
∗
n(f
∗
n(X,u),u)) > DL|X ∈ Tn(QX)] = 0, (248)
and in addition, S∗ satisfies a compression constraint (R∗L ,DL,EL) for R∗L = log|X |.
3) For every DE ≥ DL.
E+d (S,DE, QX) ≤ E
+
d (S
∗,DE, QX) + δ. (249)
Proof: We will prove this lemma by modifying the sequence of codes S into the new sequence S∗. Assume
that QX ∈ intQ(X ), and QX ∈ Pn0(X ) for some minimal n0 ∈ N. Since the statements in the lemma are only
about conditional events given the type QX , it is clear that the new secure rate-distortion codes constructed S∗n
need only be different from Sn for x ∈ Tn(QX), and so only block-lengths n mod n0 = 0 should be considered,
as otherwise Tn(QX) is empty. To wit, the limit n → ∞ should be read as limit l → ∞ for n = n0l, but this
will not be explicitly written, for the sake of brevity. Throughout the proof, quantities that are related to S∗ will
be superscripted by ∗. For brevity, we will denote the conditional key rate by R(QX) and R
∗
(QX) for S and S∗,
respectively .
Let δ > 0 be given. For any length 0 ≤ m ≤ n log|X | and y ∈ Yn define the ambiguity sets for a given key-length
as
An(y,m) , {x ∈ Tn(QX) : kn(x) = m, fn(x,u) = y for some u ∈ {0, 1}m} , (250)
and with a slight abuse of notation define the ambiguity set13 as
An(y) ,
n log|X |⋃
m=0
An(y,m). (251)
For any given y and x ∈ An(y), let us denote the reproduction w(x, y) , ϕ(y,u), where u satisfies fn(x,u) = y,
and the ambiguity set without excess-distortion
Dn(y) , {x ∈ An(y) : dL(x,w(x, y)) ≤ DL} . (252)
13Called residue class in the terminology of [1].
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Also, consider the modified ambiguity set
A∗n(y) ,

An(y)\
n(R(QX)−δ)⋃
m=0
An(y,m)\
n log|X |⋃
m=n(R(QX)+δ)
An(y,m)


⋂
Dn(y). (253)
For a given y, the eavesdropper knows that x ∈ An(y) and chooses its estimate accordingly. However, conditioned
on y, the probability of X is not uniform over An(y), since kn(x) is not the same for all x ∈ An(y). The proof
of the lemma is divided into two steps and its outline is as follows. In the first step, we will identify a sequence
of cryptograms {y∗n} which simultaneously satisfies the following properties:
1) The conditional exiguous-distortion exponent of the eavesdropper when X is distributed uniformly over
A∗n(y
∗
n) is larger than the one for X distributed over An(y∗n) according to the distribution induced by Sn.
2) The conditional exiguous-distortion exponent conditioned on Y = y∗n equals the same exponent without this
conditioning.
In the second step of the proof, we utilize the set A∗n(y∗n) to construct the new sequence of codes S∗. This is
done by the same technique used in the achievability proof of Lemma 9 - by an efficient covering of the type
class using permutations of one good set A∗n(y∗n). The two properties above of y∗n will be used to show that the
exiguous-distortion exponent of S∗ may be only slightly less than that of S .
We begin with the first step. For brevity, let us assume that X is distributed uniformly over the type class
Tn(QX), and probabilities, expectations and entropies will be calculated w.r.t. this probability distribution. So, we
only consider y such that An(y) is non-empty. If we let
A(y) , P
[
R(QX)− δ ≤ rn(X) ≤ R(QX) + δ, dL(X,W) ≤ DL|Y = y
] (254)
then for n sufficiently large
E [A(Y )] = P
[
R(QX)− δ ≤ rn(X) ≤ R(QX) + δ, dL(X,W) ≤ DL
]
≥ P
[
R(QX)− δ ≤ rn(X) ≤ R(QX) + δ
]
− P [dL(X,W) > DL]
(a)
≥ δ − P [dL(X,W) > DL]
(b)
≥ δ − 2−n[EL−D(QX ||PX)−δ] (255)
,
δ
2
(256)
where (a) is using the convergence in probability of rn(X) to R(QX) (see (11)), and (b) is since S satisfies a
compression constraint (RL,DL,EL) and the assumption D(QX ||PX ) < EL. Defining for any 0 < β < 1
V(1)n ,
{
y ∈ Yn : A(y) ≥ β ·
δ
2
}
, (257)
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then, since from the definition (254) and (256)
0 ≤
A(y)
E [A(Y )]
≤
2
δ
(258)
for all y ∈ Yn, the reverse Markov inequity (Lemma 2) implies that
P
(
Y ∈ V(1)n
)
≥
1− β
2
δ − β
, ζ(δ, β), (259)
and choosing some β∗ < min{1, 2δ}, we obtain ζ
∗(δ) , ζ(δ, β∗) > 0. Now, for γ > 1, let
V(2)n ,
{
y ∈ Yn : max
z
P [dE(X, z) ≤ DE|Y = y] < γ · max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE]
}
. (260)
Then the Markov inequality implies
P(Y 6∈ V(2)n ) = P
[
max
z
P [dE(X, z) ≤ DE|Y ] ≥ γ · max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE]
]
(261)
(a)
≤
E [maxz P [dE(X, z) ≤ DE|Y ]]
γ ·maxσ˜n∈Σ˜n P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE]
(262)
=
1
γ
(263)
where in (a) is should be recalled that z is chosen as a function of Y . Hence, by the union bound
P
(
Y ∈ V(1)n ∩ V
(2)
n
)
≥ 1− P
(
Y 6∈ V(1)n
)
− P
(
Y 6∈ V(2)n
)
(264)
≥ ζ∗(δ) −
1
γ
. (265)
Thus, for any given δ, there exists γ∗ > 1 sufficiently large (but independent of n) such that
P
(
Y ∈ V(1)n ∩ V
(2)
n
)
> 0. (266)
Therefore, there exists a sequence {y∗n} such that for all n sufficiently large, y∗n ∈ V
(1)
n ∩ V
(2)
n .
In the second step of the proof, we describe the construction of S∗n. Note that by letting
U∗ , {u : ∃x ∈ A∗n(y
∗
n) such that fn(x,u) = y∗n} (267)
and
C∗n , {ϕn(y
∗
n,u) : u ∈ U
∗} (268)
we have that A∗n(y∗n) ⊆ D(C∗n, QX ,DL). Now, recall that in Lemma 9 of the achievability proof, we have utilized
permutations of a D-cover D(C∗n, QX ,DL) (of a set C∗n) which cover the type class Tn(QX), to construct a secure
rate-distortion code. Following remark 10, the set A∗n(yn) can also be used as a constituent set in the construction
of a secure rate-distortion code, and the conditional exiguous-distortion exponent equal to the exponent achieved
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when the source block X is distributed uniformly over A∗n(y∗n), as in (176). Let us find the exponent achieved
when X is distributed uniformly over A∗n(y∗n). To this end, denote
M(δ) ,
[
n
(
R(QX)− δ
)
, n
(
R(QX) + δ
)]
. (269)
and observe that for an arbitrary eavesdropper z, and all n sufficiently large,
max
z
P [dE(X, z) ≤ DE|Y = y
∗
n] (270)
≥ P [dE(X, z) ≤ DE|Y = y
∗
n] (271)
=
∑
x∈An(y∗n):dE(x,z)≤DE
P [X = x|Y = y∗n] (272)
=
n log|X |∑
m=0
∑
x∈An(y∗n,m):dE(x,z)≤DE
P [X = x|Y = y∗n] (273)
=
∑n log|X |
m=0
∑
x∈An(y∗n,m):dE(x,z)≤DE
P (X = x, Y = y∗n)
P (Y = y∗n)
(274)
≥
∑
m∈M(δ)
∑
x∈An(y∗n,m):dE(x,z)≤DE
P (X = x, Y = y∗n)
P (Y = y∗n)
(275)
≥
∑
m∈M(δ)
∑
x∈An(y∗n,m)∩Dn(y
∗
n):dE(x,z)≤DE
P (X = x, Y = y∗n)
P (Y = y∗n)
(276)
(a)
≥ β
δ
2
·
∑
m∈M(δ)
∑
x∈An(y∗n,m)∩Dn(y
∗
n):dE(x,z)≤DE
P (X = x, Y = y∗n)
P
[
R(QX)− δ ≤ rn(X) ≤ R(QX) + δ, dL(X,W) ≤ DL, Y = y∗n
] (277)
= β
δ
2
·
∑
m∈M(δ)
∑
x∈An(y∗n,m)∩Dn(y
∗
n):dE(x,z)≤DE
P (X = x, Y = y∗n)∑
m∈M(δ)
∑
x∈An(y∗n,m)∩Dn(y
∗
n)
P (X = x, Y = y∗n)
(278)
= β
δ
2
·
∑
m∈M(δ)
∑
x∈An(y∗n,m)∩Dn(y
∗
n):dE(x,z)≤DE
P (X = x, Y = y∗n)∑
m∈M(δ)
∑
x∈An(y∗n,m)∩Dn(y
∗
n)
P (X = x, Y = y∗n)
(279)
= β
δ
2
·
∑
m∈M(δ)
∑
x∈An(y∗n,m)∩Dn(y
∗
n):dE(x,z)≤DE
P (Y = y∗n|X = x)∑
m∈M(δ)
∑
x∈An(y∗n,m)∩Dn(y
∗
n)
P (Y = y∗n|X = x)
(280)
(b)
= β
δ
2
·
∑
m∈M(δ) 2
−m · |{x ∈ An(y
∗
n,m) ∩ Dn(y
∗
n) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE}|∑
m∈M(δ) 2
−m · |An(y∗n,m) ∩ Dn(y
∗
n)|
(281)
≥ β ·
δ
2
2−n(R(QX)+δ) ·
∑
m∈M(δ) |{x ∈ An(y
∗
n,m) ∩ Dn(y
∗
n) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE}|
2−n(R(QX)−δ) ·
∑
m∈M(δ) |An(y
∗
n,m) ∩ Dn(y
∗
n)|
(282)
= β
δ
2
· 2−2nδ
∑
m∈M(δ) |{x ∈ An(y
∗
n,m) ∩ Dn(y
∗
n) : dE(x, z) ≤ DE}|∑
m∈M(δ) |An(y
∗
n,m) ∩Dn(y
∗
n)|
(283)
, β
δ
2
· 2−2nδP [dE(X
∗, z) ≤ DE] , (284)
where (a) is because as y∗n ∈ V
(1)
n implies that
P
[
R(QX)− δ ≤ rn(X) ≤ R(QX) + δ, dL(X,W) ≤ DL, Y = y
∗
n
]
β δ2
≥ P(Y = y∗n), (285)
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and (b) is because for admissible encoders and x ∈ An(y∗n,m)
P (Y = y∗n|X = x) = 2
−m. (286)
Thus,
lim sup
n→∞
−
1
n
logmax
z
P [dE(X
∗, z) ≤ DE] ≥ lim sup
n→∞
−
1
n
max
z
logP [dE(X, z) ≤ DE|Y = y
∗
n]− 3δ (287)
(a)
= E+d (S,DE, QX)− 3δ (288)
where (a) is because y∗n ∈ V
(2)
n . So, by choosing δ sufficiently small, we can achieve (249) by the permutation
construction of Lemma 9.
Finally, as the legitimate reconstruction w(x, y∗n) of any x ∈ A∗n(y∗n) satisfies dL(x,w(x, y∗n)) ≤ DL, the
permutation construction assures this property for all x ∈ Tn(QX). So, it is easy to verify that if S has excess-
distortion exponent EL at distortion level DL, then S∗ has an even larger exponent. As R∗L = log|X |, the compression
constraint (R∗L ,DL,EL) is satisfied by S∗.
We are now ready for the second and final step of the proof of the converse part of Theorem 1.
Proof of converse part of Theorem 1: Let a sequence of secure rate-distortion codes S be given, which
satisfies the compression constraint (RL,DL,EL), and let δ > 0 be given. From Proposition 3, it may be assumed
that the eavesdropper is aware of the type of the source block QX . Moreover, from Lemma 13, it may be assumed
that Sn satisfies the three properties in Lemma 13 for all QX such that D(QX ||PX) < EL. Specifically, the first
property implies that for some rate-function ρ : P(X ) → R+ the code Sn has a fixed rate rn(x) = ρ(QX) for all
x ∈ Tn(QX), and ρ(QX) ≤ R(S, QX) + δ, as long as D(QX ||PX) < EL.
Let us first focus on a type QX that satisfies D(QX ||PX) < EL, and a specific (type-aware) eavesdropper for
Sn. The eavesdropper first produces a guess uˆ of the key-bits u (with a uniform probability over {0, 1}nρ(QX ), and
then decodes wˆ = ϕn(y, uˆ). Since dE(·, ·) is more lenient than dL(·, ·), and DE ≥ DL, there exists a zˆ ∈ Zn such
that
{x ∈ X n : dL(x, wˆ) ≤ DL} ⊆ {x ∈ X
n : dE(x, zˆ) ≤ DL} (289)
⊆ {x ∈ X n : dE(x, zˆ) ≤ DE} , (290)
and so the final eavesdropper estimate is z = zˆ. For any n, let us bound the resulting conditional exiguous-distortion
probability.
P
[
dE(X, Zˆ) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)
]
≥ P
[
Uˆ = U|X ∈ Tn(QX)
]
×
P
[
dE(X, Zˆ) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX), Uˆ = U
]
(291)
≥ 2−nρ(QX) · P
[
dE(X, Zˆ) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX), Uˆ = U
]
(292)
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≥ 2−nρ(QX) · P [dL(X,W) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)] (293)
(a)
= 2−nρ(QX) (294)
where (a) is from the second property assured for S in Lemma 13.
We now analyze the exiguous-distortion probability of S . Since |Pn(X )|≤ (n+ 1)|X |
pd(Sn,DE) =
∑
QX∈Pn(X )
P [X ∈ Tn(QX)] max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)] (295)
.
= max
QX∈Pn(X )
e−nD(QX ||PX) · max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)] (296)
= exp
(
−n · min
QX∈Pn(X )
{
D (QX ||PX )− (297)
1
n
log max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)]
})
(298)
Now, let 0 < ǫ < EL be given, and let Q∗X ∈ P(X ) be such that
D (Q∗X ||PX) + lim sup
n→∞
{
−
1
n
log max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(Q
∗
X)]
}
≤
inf
QX∈P(X )
{
D (QX ||PX) + lim sup
n→∞
{
−
1
n
log max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)]
}}
+ ǫ (299)
and let m0 be sufficiently large so that
sup
n>m0
{
−
1
n
log max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(Q
∗
X)]
}
≤ lim sup
n→∞
{
−
1
n
log max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(Q
∗
X)]
}
+ ǫ. (300)
Then,
E+d (S,DE) = lim sup
n→∞
min
QX∈Pn(X )
{
D (QX ||PX)−
1
n
log max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)]
}
(301)
= lim
m→∞
sup
n≥m
min
QX∈Pn(X )
{
D (QX ||PX )−
1
n
log max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)]
}
(302)
(a)
= lim
m→∞
sup
n≥m
inf
QX∈P(X )
{
D (QX ||PX)−
1
n
log max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)]
}
(303)
≤ sup
n≥m0
inf
QX∈P(X )
{
D (QX ||PX)−
1
n
log max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)]
}
(304)
≤ inf
QX∈P(X )
{
D (QX ||PX) + sup
n≥m0
{
−
1
n
log max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)]
}}
(305)
≤
{
D (Q∗X ||PX) + sup
n>m0
{
−
1
n
log max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(Q
∗
X)]
}}
(306)
(b)
≤ inf
QX∈P(X )
{
D (QX ||PX) + (307)
lim sup
n→∞
{
−
1
n
log max
σ˜n∈Σ˜n
P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)]
}}
+ 2ǫ (308)
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= inf
QX∈P(X )
{
D (QX ||PX) + E
+
d (S,DE, QX)
}
+ 2ǫ (309)
≤ inf
QX∈P(X ):D(QX ||PX)<EL
{
D (QX ||PX) + E
+
d (S,DE, QX)
}
+ 2ǫ (310)
(c)
≤ inf
QX∈P(X ):D(QX ||PX)<EL
{
D (QX ||PX ) + E
+
d (S,DE, QX)
}
+ 2ǫ+ δ (311)
(d)
≤ inf
QX∈P(X ):D(QX ||PX)<EL
{D (QX ||PX) + ρ(QX)}+ 2ǫ+ δ (312)
(e)
≤ R+ 2ǫ+ 4δ, (313)
where (a) is because, by assumption, if Tn(QX) is empty then P [dE(X,Z) ≤ DE|X ∈ Tn(QX)] = 0 , (b) is from
(299) and (300), and (c) is from the third property of S promised by Lemma 13. The passage (d) follows from
(294), and so it remains to prove (e). To this end, recall that E[rn(X)] ≤ R for all n was assumed. Define, for
0 < ǫ < EL, the typical set
T˜ (PX , ǫ) , {QX ∈ P(X ) : D(QX ||PX) ≤ ǫ} , (314)
and with a slight abuse of notation, define T˜n(PX , ǫ) , T˜ (PX , ǫ) ∩ Pn(X ). Then, by the law of large numbers
lim
n→∞
∑
QX∈T˜n(PX ,ǫ)
P [X ∈ Tn(QX)] = 1. (315)
Now, assume by contradiction, that for all QX ∈ T˜ (PX , ǫ) we have ρ(QX) ≥ R + 3δ. Since by construction
ρ(QX) ≤ R(S, QX) + δ, the uniform convergence of E[rn(X)|X ∈ Tn(QX)] to R(S, QX) (see (11) and the
discussion that follows) implies that there exists n0 such that for all n > n0
E[rn(X)|X ∈ Tn(QX)] ≥ R(S, QX)− δ
≥ ρ(QX)− 2δ
≥ R+ δ, (316)
for all QX ∈ T˜n(PX , ǫ). So, from (315), there exists n1, such that for all n > n1 we have that P
[
X ∈ T˜n(PX , ǫ)
]
≥
1
1+δ/2·log|X |
, and then for all n > max{n0, n1}
E [rn(X)] =
∑
QX∈Pn(X )
P [X ∈ Tn(QX)] · E[rn(X)|X ∈ Tn(QX)] (317)
≥
∑
QX∈T˜n(PX ,ǫ)
P [X ∈ Tn(QX)] · E[rn(X)|X ∈ Tn(QX)] (318)
≥
(
min
QX∈T˜n(PX ,ǫ)
E[rn(X)|X ∈ Tn(QX)]
)
·
∑
QX∈T˜n(PX ,ǫ)
P [X ∈ Tn(QX)] (319)
(a)
≥ (R+ δ)
1
1 + δ/2·log|X |
(320)
46
> (R+ δ)
1
1 + δ/R
(321)
= R, (322)
where (a) follows from (316). However, this is a contradiction to the fact that Sn satisfies E [rn(X)] ≤ R for all
n. Thus, there must exist QX ∈ T˜ (PX , ǫ) ⊂ T˜ (PX ,EL) such that ρ(QX) < R+ 3δ, which directly leads to (e) in
(313). Since ǫ > 0 and δ > 0 are arbitrary, the first term in the upper bound of (18) is proved, i.e. E+d (S,DE) ≤ R.
To prove the second term in the upper bound of (18), i.e. E+d (S,DE) ≤ E∗e (DE), note that the eavesdropper can
always ignore the cryptogram and blindly choose its estimate z (based only on the type QX). Thus, by similar
arguments leading to (229), it can be shown that for all n sufficiently large
E+d (S,DE, QX) ≤ RE(QX ,DE). (323)
The method of types, as in (297) and the definition of E∗e (DE) in (16), complete the proof.
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